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Abstract
We present a factor-proportions trade model in which heterogeneous firms can offshore
intermediate inputs subject to fixed offshoring costs. In the skill-abundant country, high-
productivity firms offshore a larger range of labor-intensive inputs to the labor-abundant
countries than low-productivity firms. Differently from the traditional versions of factor-
proportions trade theory, Heckscher-Ohlin forces operate at the within-industry level, leading
to endogenous variation in skill intensity across firms that is positively correlated with firm
productivity. Using French firm-level data for the years 1996 to 2007, we provide empiri-
cal support for the factor proportions channel through which offshoring to labor-abundant
countries affects the firm-level skill intensities of French manufacturers.
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1 Introduction
The heterogeneous-firm literature of the last 15 years has not only uncovered important within-
industry differences in productivity and export performance, but more recently also a substantial
within-industry variation of skill intensities between firms, with skill intensities correlating pos-
itively with productivity. Although this within-sector variation is larger than differences in skill
intensities between narrowly defined industries (e.g., Corcos et al., 2013), most of trade the-
ory ignores it (e.g., the Heckscher-Ohlin model). The few studies that allow for within-sector
heterogeneity in factor intensities simply take it as given (e.g., Crozet and Trionfetti, 2013). Sim-
ilarly, some recent contributions just posit a positive correlation between productivity and factor
intensities (e.g., Harrigan and Reshef, forthcoming).
In this paper, we present a factor-proportions model with heterogeneous firms and costly off-
shoring that endogenously generates within-industry dispersion in skill intensity, which correlates
positively with firm productivity. Our study sheds light on the specific microeconomic channels
that lead firms to self-select into offshoring and determine the type of goods they offshore, as
well as the country characteristics of their offshoring destinations. We also show how changes
in offshoring costs affect the relative demand for skills at the firm and the industry level. More-
over, we provide empirical evidence for the factor proportions mechanism of offshoring using a
quasi-exhaustive panel dataset of French manufacturing firms for the period 1996-2007.
In the model, intermediate inputs differ in their relative factor intensities and countries have
different relative factor endowments, as in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Firms are
heterogeneous in terms of productivity, and offshoring of intermediates requires the payment of
per-input fixed offshoring costs. Firms must therefore weigh the lower marginal cost resulting
from offshoring, say a labor-intensive input to a labor-abundant country, against the fixed costs
implied by such a decision.
From the perspective of a skill-abundant country, in equilibrium, the low-productivity firms
produce all inputs domestically. Sufficiently productive firms offshore the most labor-intensive
inputs to very labor-abundant countries. Firms with even higher productivity levels find it prof-
itable to also import relatively more skill-intensive inputs from not-so-labor-abundant countries.
Such imports substitute for domestic unskilled employment, making domestic production more
skill intensive. Thus, at the firm level, productivity and skill intensity of domestic production
are positively correlated, generating endogenous within-industry variation in skill intensities.
Reductions in offshoring costs lead to a boost in imports from labor-abundant countries and,
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simultaneously, to an increase in the skill bias of domestic production.
Our model is able to explain a set of stylized facts for the manufacturing industry in France
(a skill-abundant country) linking firm productivity, import behavior, and the skill intensity of
domestic employment, that we present in the empirical part of the paper. A first look at the
data shows that the within-industry dispersion in skill intensities is much larger for importers
from labor-abundant countries than for non-importers. Moreover, importers from labor-abundant
countries are more skill intensive in their domestic production than non-importers, and the pos-
itive trend in offshoring to these countries since the mid-nineties runs parallel to the surge in
the skill intensities of those importers. Our econometric analysis reveals an additional set of
facts that square with our model’s predictions: (i) the firm-level average skill intensity of imports
from labor-abundant countries is positively correlated with firm productivity; (ii) for a given
labor-abundant country of origin, more productive firms import more skill-intensive products on
average; (iii) out of the set of labor-abundant countries, less productive firms import only from the
most labor-abundant countries, while more productive firms import also from the relatively more
skill-abundant ones; (iv) firms that increase imports from labor-abundant countries experience
a substantial increase in their domestic skill intensities; (v) firms that raise the skill intensity of
imports from labor-abundant countries increase the skill intensity of their domestic employment;
(vi) our instrumental-variables estimates, which exploit supply shocks in France’s trading part-
ners and reductions in EU external tariffs, provide causal evidence that the increase in imports
from labor-abundant countries (induced by foreign supply shocks and tariff reductions) has led
to a substantial increase in the French manufacturing industry’s skill intensity over the sample
period. We find that all of the observed within-firm changes in skill intensity can be explained
by increased offshoring to labor-abundant countries.
The insights of our work complement our understanding of a number of issues that have
received much attention in the international trade literature. In particular, we highlight that
an essential channel of factor proportions trade operates within industries and even within firms
rather than between industries, which has been the focus of traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
This is important in order to understand the impact of international trade on factor prices and the
factor content of trade. Whereas the between-industry variation in factor intensities is a necessary
assumption in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, the within-industry variation arising here is a
subtle manifestation of Heckscher-Ohlin forces at work in combination with firm-heterogeneity in
size or productivity. Second, we provide microeconometric evidence on the relationship between
offshoring and firm-level skill intensity that operates via the factor proportions channel.
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We contribute to different strands of the literature. Our modeling approach is inspired by
Helpman (1984), who provides a Heckscher-Ohlin model of multinationals in which production
is vertically disintegrated according to comparative advantage. Also closely related is Feenstra
and Hanson (1997), where firms offshore some of their labor-intensive activities in response to
liberalization of capital markets, thereby reducing the demand for skilled labor in the U.S. We
extend their work by introducing firm heterogeneity into the theoretical framework, and by
deriving and testing implications at the firm level. A quite different view of the effect of offshoring
on factor demand and wages has been put forward by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In
their model there exist complementarities between domestically performed and offshored tasks.
As a consequence, offshoring of unskilled tasks may benefit both unskilled and skilled workers. In
contrast, in our model offshoring and domestic production are perfect substitutes, thus offshoring
reduces demand for the offshored factor and its price.
Our theoretical model fits in the literature of Heckscher-Ohlin trade with heterogeneous firms.
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) build a two-country, two-sector, two-factor Melitz (2003)
model, where sectors differ in their factor intensities, firms are homogeneous in terms of factor
intensities within a given sector and all factor-proportions trade is in final goods between sec-
tors. Recently, Crozet and Trionfetti (2013) have extended their model to allow for exogenous
within-industry differences in factor intensities. In contrast, our model endogenously generates
differences in factor intensities within sectors due to factor proportions trade in inputs. Ma et
al. (2014) develop a multi-product version of Bernard et al. (2007) and show that Chinese firms
that start exporting focus on their core competencies and expand the production of relatively
labor-intensive products.
In a model with heterogeneous firms but with no factor proportions trade, Antra`s et al. (2014)
characterize offshoring patterns for U.S. firms and estimate them structurally using a quantitative
multi-country, many-good model a` la Eaton and Kortum (2002) that features complementarities
between sourcing locations. Similarly to Antra`s et al. (2014), our model delivers a natural
pecking order of offshoring destinations, which, however, is determined by the forces of factor-
proportions-driven comparative advantage. In particular, firms from a skill-abundant country
would first import the most labor-intensive inputs from the most labor-abundant countries, as
these provide the largest cost reductions.
Our theory also delivers complementarities across offshoring destinations, though generated
by a different mechanism than in Antra`s et al. (2014). In particular, our model predicts that
the impact of importing an additional country-product combination on a firm’s global offshoring
4
strategy depends on the country’s factor abundance and the input’s factor intensity: in the case
of a firm located in a skill-abundant country, having lower offshoring costs to other countries
or for other inputs leads firms to import more from a given location. In addition, this effect is
stronger if the other sourcing countries are more labor abundant or when the other imported
inputs are more labor intensive. We show that this prediction is borne by the data: for French
firms importing from the set of labor-abundant countries, holding constant firm-level productivity,
firms importing more labor-intensive products from other origin countries import a larger value
from a given location; moreover, firms sourcing from relatively more labor-abundant countries
import a larger value from any given country.
Finally, we also contribute to the empirical literature on offshoring and domestic skill demand
using firm-level data. Kramarz and Biscourp (2007) study the effect of imports on employment
growth and skill upgrading for a sample of French firms during 1986-1992. They find that imports
of finished goods from low-wage countries are associated with lower employment growth, with
the effects present only in the case of large firms. Mion and Zhu (2013), using data on Belgian
firms, find that import competition from China induces skill upgrading of the domestic workforce.
Hummels et al. (2014) employ data on Danish importers to provide evidence that employment
and wages of high-skilled workers are positively affected by offshoring.1 In contrast to these
papers, which are purely empirical, we investigate the specific theoretical mechanisms through
which skill demand at the firm level is affected by offshoring to labor-abundant countries. In
particular, we carefully measure the factor-proportions channel of importing and show that it
matters for determining the skill intensity of domestic production.
2 A Preliminary Look at the Data
In this section, we describe some of the salient features of the French manufacturing employ-
ment and import data, which provide the motivation for our theoretical model. We use the
administrative firm-level data that we describe in detail in Section 4.
We begin by analyzing the extent of intra-industry heterogeneity in firm-level skill intensities
in French manufacturing. Figure 2 illustrates the amount of intra-industry heterogeneity in
firm-level skill intensities by plotting the kernel density of the firm-level (log) skill ratio, defined
as the proportion of non-blue-collar employment relative to blue-collar employment. Here, the
1Using French data, Carluccio et al. (2015) find that offshoring of finished goods increases the wages of managers
but has no effect on the wages of blue-collar workers.
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variable of interest has been demeaned at the 4-digit sector level, so that the density can be
interpreted as pure within-industry heterogeneity in firm-level (log) skill ratios. The distribution
is approximately normal, with a standard deviation of 1.628. Thus, there is evidence for pervasive
intra-industry heterogeneity in skill ratios.
Table 1 presents complementary evidence: for each year from 1996 to 2007 we report the mean,
the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/abs(mean)) of (log)
skill ratios, as well as a within/between sector variance decomposition. The disaggregation of the
manufacturing industries is again at the 4-digit level. The coefficient of variation is large (around
2.1) and 80 percent of the variance of skill intensity is explained by within-sector variation between
firms, while only 20 percent of the variation is between sectors. These patterns are remarkably
stable over time.
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Figure 1: Distribution of log skill ratio.
The figure plots the distribution of the firm-level log skill ratio, defined as the ratio of employment of non-blue
collar workers to blue-collar production workers per firm. Observations are deviations from the industry means.
Thus, the distribution shows the within-sector dispersion in firm-level log skill ratios.
During the same sample period, offshoring to labor-abundant countries has gained much
relevance in French manufacturing. Here, we define labor-abundant countries as those with less
than 95 percent of the French level of secondary schooling in the population.2 The left panel of
Figure 2 presents the aggregate trend in offshoring to labor-abundant countries measured as the
fraction of imports of French manufacturing firms originating in labor-abundant countries: from
1996 to 2007 there has been a large increase in imports from these countries, from less than 16
to more than 20 percent of total French manufacturing imports.
The right panel of Figure 2 provides some preliminary evidence that the trends in skill intensi-
ties and offshoring patterns might be related. It shows that, at the same time, firms offshoring to
2In the robustness checks in the Online Appendix, we consider an 80-percent threshold and show that our results
are not sensitive to the choice of the threshold.
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Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Coeff. Frac. Variance Frac. Variance
Variation between sectors within sectors
1996 55,806 -0.500 0.968 1.935 0.205 0.795
1997 57,452 -0.496 0.970 1.953 0.209 0.790
1998 56,022 -0.490 0.978 1.996 0.204 0.796
1999 56,494 -0.484 0.978 2.018 0.213 0.787
2000 54,425 -0.490 0.985 2.008 0.206 0.793
2001 53,778 -0.476 0.985 2.066 0.210 0.790
2002 55,911 -0.462 0.984 2.128 0.196 0.804
2003 54,428 -0.447 0.984 2.199 0.204 0.796
2004 53,097 -0.412 0.996 2.421 0.195 0.805
2005 52,085 -0.432 0.985 2.281 0.205 0.795
2006 51,670 -0.444 0.989 2.229 0.212 0.788
2007 45,752 -0.458 0.993 2.169 0.223 0.777
All 646,920 -0.467 0.983 2.105 0.200 0.800
Table 1: Firm-level skill ratio: dispersion and variance decomposition
The table shows means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variation (std./abs(mean)) of log firm-level skill
intensity (defined as non-blue-collar employment/ employment of blue-collar production workers) for the sample
of French manufacturing firms by year. It also presents the fraction of the total industry variance in skill intensity
that is attributed to between-industry and within-industry variance.
Figure 2: Trend in imports from labor-abundant countries and trends in log skill ratios.
The left panel plots the share of imports originating in labor-abundant countries (countries with less than 95
percent of the French level of secondary schooling) in total French manufacturing imports. The right panel plots
the average firm-level log skill ratio, defined as the ratio of non-blue collar to blue-collar employment, separately
for three categories of firms: importers from countries with less than 95 percent of the French level of secondary
schooling; firms that never import; all manufacturing firms.
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labor-abundant countries have become substantially more skill-intensive (as far as their domestic
labor force is concerned). It plots the mean (log) skill-ratio of French manufacturing firms, sepa-
rately for all firms, importers from labor-abundant countries, and non-importers. Here importers
are defined as firms that import in the current period from labor-abundant countries, while non-
importers are firms that never import during the sample period. It is apparent that, on average,
French manufacturing firms have become more skill intensive during the sample period. Im-
portantly, this increase is driven by importers from labor-abundant countries. By contrast, the
skill-ratio of non-importers has hardly changed over the sample period.
Table 2 provides similar evidence. It shows the average skill intensity by year separately for
non-importers and importers from labor-abundant countries. First, note that importers from
labor-abundant countries are more skill-intensive than non-importers: the log skill ratio is -0.238
for importers from labor-abundant countries relative to -0.466 for non-importers. Moreover, the
increase in skill intensity was also much larger for importers from labor-abundant countries (from
-0.305 to -0.219) than for non-importers, for which it actually decreased during the sample period
(from -0.479 to -0.490). Finally, Table 2 shows that importers from labor-abundant countries dis-
play a much larger dispersion in skill intensities than non-importers: the coefficient of variation is
4.538 for importers compared to 2.027 for non-importers. Moreover, such dispersion has increased
relatively more for the group of importers than for the group of non-importers.
Finally, note that the firm-level (log) skill ratio is highly correlated with log (TFP): a simple
regression reveals a highly significant slope coefficient of around 0.4. This relationship is robust
to including sector- and year-fixed effects (regressions not reported).
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Non-Importers Importers (countries ≤ 95% French sec. school.)
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Coeff. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Coeff.
Variation Variation
1996 30,386 -0.479 0.932 1.947 6,007 -0.305 1.056 3.469
1997 30,815 -0.478 0.933 1.951 6,455 -0.277 1.083 3.908
1998 29,296 -0.476 0.939 1.972 6,851 -0.274 1.092 3.984
1999 29,670 -0.466 0.940 2.018 7,210 -0.259 1.082 4.171
2000 28,298 -0.479 0.946 1.977 7,599 -0.274 1.084 3.965
2001 27,810 -0.472 0.944 2.002 7,831 -0.257 1.105 4.299
2002 29,110 -0.464 0.941 2.030 8,325 -0.235 1.010 4.686
2003 28,040 -0.456 0.943 2.067 8,453 -0.215 1.093 5.081
2004 27,328 -0.418 0.965 2.316 8,749 -0.193 1.078 5.597
2005 26,866 -0.454 0.949 2.090 9,139 -0.199 1.075 5.387
2006 26,971 -0.465 0.955 2.054 9,494 -0.208 1.065 5.123
2007 23,658 -0.490 0.957 1.954 9,075 -0.219 1.064 4.868
All 338,248 -0.466 0.945 2.027 95,189 -0.238 1.082 4.538
Table 2: Firm-level skill ratio: importers from labor-abundant countries versus non-importers
The table shows means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variation (std./abs(mean)) of log firm-level skill
intensity (defined as non-blue-collar employment/ employment of blue-collar production workers) for the sample
of French firms by year. It also presents the fraction of the total industry variance in log skill intensity that is
attributed to between-industry and within-industry variance. ”Non-importers” includes firms that never import
during the sample period. ”Importers (countries ≤ 95% French sec. school.)” includes firms that import from
countries with years of secondary schooling in the population lower than 95% of that of France.
3 The Model
This section presents a stylized model of offshoring with heterogeneous firms in a Heckscher-Ohlin
environment. For tractability purposes, we make a number of simplifying assumptions here, some
of which are relaxed in the next section.
There are two countries, Home and Foreign (denoted by *), endowed with different amounts
of skilled labor (“skills”) H, and unskilled labor (“labor”) L. We assume that Home is skill
abundant, H/L > H∗/L∗. For simplicity, we assume a symmetric scenario, whereby H = L∗ >
L = H∗. Other than this, the two countries are identical in their preferences, technologies, and
parameter values.
There is one final-good industry, that we model roughly along the lines of Melitz (2003).
Consumers derive utility from a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of final-good varieties:
Q =
[∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, (1)
where σ > 1. Ω denotes the set of available varieties of the final good. Each firm produces a
different variety of the final good, over which it has monopoly power. Varieties are produced with
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two intermediate inputs, y1 and y2. We assume the following production function for final goods:
q(γ) = γ
(
y1
1/2
)1/2( y2
1/2
)1/2
. (2)
There is firm heterogeneity in the productivity γ with which the two intermediates are trans-
formed into output. We assume γ is distributed Pareto with location parameter k = 1 (γ ≥ 1)
and shape parameter a > σ − 1, thus leading to the density g (γ) = aγ−(a+1). Intermediate
inputs are produced with the “extreme” factor intensities specified in the following production
functions:3
y1 = h/τ
j , (3)
y2 = l/τ
j , (4)
where h is the skills input and l is the labor input and j = o, n denotes the decision of the firm
whether to outsource (o) or not (n) the production of intermediate inputs. If the intermediate
inputs are produced in-house by the final-good producers, then τn = 1. If produced out of the
firm, then firms need to pay a variable iceberg outsourcing cost τ o ∈ (1, H/L) .4 This variable
offshoring cost can be interpreted as a friction (e.g., a trade barrier) and as a cost or productivity
disadvantage due to distance. Besides this variable iceberg cost, a fixed cost fo in terms of good
Q must be paid per type of intermediate input not produced in-house. International trade of
final goods is subject to no variable transportation costs. Skills and labor are internationally
immobile.
Factor and intermediate-input markets are perfectly competitive. Before entry, final-good
producers must pay a fixed cost fe in terms of good Q in order to pick a draw of γ. For
simplicity, we assume no fixed cost must be paid in order to supply positive amounts of a variety
to a particular market. Hence, all firms that incur the fixed cost fe operate in both the domestic
and foreign markets regardless of their realization of γ.
We take the domestic return of skills as the nume´raire: wh = 1 and denote the domestic
unskilled labor wage rate with wl. Given the model’s symmetry, in equilibrium M = M
∗,
E = E∗, P = P ∗, wl = w∗h, wh = w
∗
l , γo = γ
∗
o , where M is the mass of firms that incur fixed cost
fe, P is the aggregate price index and E ≡ whH +wlL denotes expenditure. γo is the threshold
3This assumption is harmless in terms of the intuitions discussed below, and simplifies the algebra notably.
4We avoid modeling any type of hold-up problem. See Antra`s (2003) and Antra`s and Helpman (2004).
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productivity level for offshoring, as explained below.5
3.1 Offshoring Decision
Notice that no firm finds it worth to outsource in the own country because of the outsourcing
costs (fo, τ o) and the lack of any cost advantage. Assuming wl = w
∗
h > wh = w
∗
l = 1 (this
will be proven below), it is not worth offshoring abroad the intermediate input intensive in the
own country’s abundant factor.6 Hence, the offshoring decision is reduced to a decision about
whether or not to offshore abroad the intermediate input intensive in the own country’s scarce
factor. Since, in this respect, final-good producers will simply weigh the gain from a lower
marginal cost against a fixed cost, we can model the offshoring decision as a threshold γo: for
γ ≥ γo, the firm offshores the entire production of the intermediate input (intensive in the own
country’s scarce factor); for γ < γo, the firm produces the two intermediate inputs in-house.
This argument can be better understood by examining the profit function of Home’s final-
good producers. They charge a markup σ/ (σ − 1) over their marginal cost, and make profits
(abstracting from the sunk cost Pfe)
Πj (γ) =
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ 2E
σP 1−σ
[
MCj (γ)
]1−σ − I (γ)Pfo, (5)
where j = o and I (γ) = 1 for γ ≥ γo and j = n and I (γ) = 0 for γ < γo,
MCo (γ) = γ−1 (τ o)1/2 , (6)
MCn (γ) = γ−1w1/2l . (7)
The left panel of Figure 3 plots the profit function of equation (5) for j = o, n against γσ−1. The
function Πo
(
γσ−1
)
is steeper than Πn
(
γσ−1
)
because MCo (γ) < MCn (γ).7
3.2 Equilibrium
The model’s equilibrium conditions can be expressed as follows:8
5As we discussed, the model’s symmetry implies that the labor-abundant country is a mirror image of the
skill-abundant one. This would not be the case if, for example, the labor-abundant country had a comparative
disadvantage in assembling the final goods. In this case, trade patterns would consist primarily of final goods being
exported by the skill-abundant country in exchange for the labor-intensive intermediates.
6The assumption that wh < wl is admittedly rather unrealistic. This is an artifact of symmetry. The key results
of the model would not change if we allowed for productivity shifts for skilled workers. All that matters for our
results is that the skill premium in the skill-abundant country is lower than in the labor-abundant country.
7Below we prove that wl > τ
o in equilibrium.
8Given the model’s symmetry, we need only need to consider the equilibrium conditions related to Home.
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(γo)σ-1
πo(γσ-1)
πn(γσ-1)
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Offshoring decision
w τo K/L 
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1 
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Figure 3: Offshoring decision (left panel), general equilibrium (right panel).
1. The final-good firm’s indifference between offshoring or not (Πo (γo) = Π
n (γo)) pins down
the threshold productivity level γo:(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ 2E
σP 1−σ
[
MCo (γo)
1−σ −MCn (γo)
1−σ]− Pfo = 0. (8)
2. The price level P is simply the CES ideal price index. Given the symmetry assumptions
we impose, it simplifies to
P 1−σ = 2M
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ [∫ γo
1
(
γ−1w1/2l
)1−σ
dG (γ) + (τ o)
1−σ
2
∫ ∞
γo
γσ−1dG (γ)
]
. (9)
3. Free entry leads to expected zero profits for the producers of final-good varieties. Notice
that, in comparison with Melitz (2003), all firms paying fixed cost fe will produce positive
amounts, as we assume away the presence of fixed associated to supplying individual markets.9
∫ ∞
1
[(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ 2E
σP 1−σ
[
MCj (γ)
]1−σ − PIj (γ) fo] dG (γ) = Pfe. (10)
4. Putting together the market clearing conditions for skills and labor,
1
2
∫ γo
1
(
γ−1w1/2l
)1−σ
dG (γ) + (τ o)
1−σ
2
∫∞
γo
γσ−1dG (γ)
1
2w
−1
l
∫ γo
1
(
γ−1w1/2l
)1−σ
dG (γ)
=
H
L
. (11)
9The assumption that fixed costs are in terms of good Q leads to a “tricky” issue. For σ = 2 the price level
P cancels out from the free-entry condition: when P changes, revenues and fixed costs move in lockstep, thus
leaving profits unaffected. This leads to the indeterminacy of M . To avoid this problem, we impose the constraint
σ > 2. In this case, revenues rise faster than fixed costs with an increase in P .
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The first term in the numerator is associated to the demand for Home’s skills by the Home firms
that do not offshore. The second term in the numerator is associated to the demand for Home’s
skills by offshoring Home and Foreign firms. Finally, the term in the denominator is associated
to the demand for Home’s labor by the Home firms that do not offshore. Home’s (and Foreign’s)
offshoring firms do not demand any Home labor.
Condition 4 can be rewritten as
ΦFMC (γo, wl, H/L, τ
o) = γa−σ+1o
1
2w
1−σ
2
l
(
w−1H/L− 1)
1
2w
1−σ
2
l
(
w−1l H/L− 1
)
+ (τ o)
1−σ
2
= 1, (12)
whereas conditions 1-3 yield
ΦOFE (γo, wl, H/L, τ
o, fe/fo) =
a−σ+1
a γ
σ−1
o
[
(τ o)
1−σ
2 − w
1−σ
2
l
]
(γ−ao + fe/fo)
w
1−σ
2
l
(
1− γσ−a−1o
)
+ γσ−a−1o
= 1. (13)
Equations (12) and (13) constitute a system of two non-linear equations in wl and γo. Once we
solve this system, we can find positive solutions for M and P from conditions 2 and 3 (see the
Appendix).
We now characterize the schedules γo (wl) that result from equations (12) and (13), and discuss
some comparative statics exercises. (See the right panel of Figure 3 for a graphical representation
and the Appendix for details). Our arguments are based on the guess that the solution must
entail τ o < wl < H/L, which will be verified. This guess is obviously not random. First, it is
easy to see that prohibitive costs of offshoring (e.g. fo = ∞, τ o = ∞) lead to an equilibrium in
which wl = H/L. Since offshoring reduces the relative demand for each country’s scarce factor,
we should expect a lower wl when offshoring costs are not prohibitive. Second, notice from our
discussion above on the offshoring decision that τ o > wl would imply no offshoring, ruling out the
realization of gains from trade in the model. The factor-market clearing condition (12) yields a
positive relationship between γo and wl: the fewer firms offshore, the stronger the relative demand
for labor at home, and therefore the higher the relative factor price wl. For wl = 1, γo > 1.
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Since γFMCo (wl) is continuous and positively sloped, for wl = τ
o > 1, γo > 1, too. Finally,
γo → ∞ is associated with wl → H/L: if no firm offshores, then the relative wage matches its
counterpart for the case with prohibitive offshoring costs.
10γo = 1 would violate labor-market equilibrium, as no firm would employ unskilled workers.
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Notice that equation (13) can only hold for wl > τ
o. Under the (sufficient) condition11
a− σ + 1
σ − 1
fo
fe
< 1, (14)
equation (13) yields a negative relationship between γo and wl: the higher the relative factor
price wl, the more home firms find it optimal to offshore. wl → τ o is associated with γo → ∞:
for a relative wage wl = τ
o, no firm finds it optimal to offshore for a positive fo.
The characteristics of these two schedules guarantee the existence of a unique intersection in
the sub-space [wl × γo|wl ∈ (τ o, H/L) , γo ∈ (1,∞)]. In spite of the model’s Heckscher-Ohlin “fla-
vor”, the equilibrium does not yield factor price equalization because of the offshoring frictions.12
We now derive a number of comparative-statics results.
3.3 Comparative Statics
The tractability of the model enables us to carry out a number of comparative statics exercises:
1. An increase in fo shifts the OFE-schedule upwards, thus leading to a higher γo and a
higher wl. A higher f
o makes offshoring non profitable for some firms; this raises the relative
demand for labor, thus raising its relative price wl.
2. An increase in τ o shifts the OFE-schedule upwards (a higher τ o reverses the profitability
of offshoring for some firms) and the FMC-schedule downwards (for a given γ∗o = γo, the relative
demand for the abundant factor by the rest of the world decreases, as offshoring is now subject
to a higher variable cost). Thus, an increase in τ o raises wl. The Appendix shows that the
effect on γo is also unambiguously positive, that is, the vertical upward shift of the OFE-schedule
dominates the shift of the FMC-schedule in the opposite direction. In the empirical section below
we will interpret changes in τ o as variation in import tariffs or, alternatively, as foreign export
supply shocks. Observe that a reduction in τ o can also be interpreted as a positive aggregate
productivity shock.
3. An increase in fe shifts the OFE-schedule downwards, thus leading to a lower γo and a
11Recall that equation (13) is the result of combining equilibrium conditions 1-3. When differentiating (13) with
respect to γo, we come across effects that operate in different directions in the numerator of equation (14): (i) The
difference in variable profits under offshoring and non-offshoring of condition 1 depends positively on γo, since more
productive firms experience a larger increase in profits from offshoring given their larger sales. (ii) The fixed costs
that enter the free-entry condition 3 depend negatively on γo as the probability of paying the fixed cost to offshore
decreases with a higher offshoring threshold productivity level. Sufficient equation (14) assumes that the former
effect is stronger than the latter. This enables us to sign the derivative of (13) with respect to γo as positive, and
subsequently the implicit derivative of γo with respect to wl as negative. Notice that the sufficient condition holds
for an fo sufficiently small relative to fe.
12It is easy to show that as long as fo > 0 factor price equalization is not possible (even if τo = 1).
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lower wl. The higher f
e, the less firms in the market; this raises the price level P , and makes
firms larger (in terms of sales); therefore it pays off for more firms to offshore, thus leading to
downward pressure on the relative factor price wl.
4. An increase in H/L shifts the FMC-schedule to the right, thus leading to a lower γo and
a higher wl. A higher H/L makes labor relatively more scarce; this raises the relative price of
labor, and makes offshoring profitable for firms with lower productivity levels.
The two-sector model captures most of the stylized facts, which we have described in section
2: it generates within-sector heterogeneity in skill intensity; moreover, skill intensity correlates
positively with productivity; finally, firms that offshore to labor-abundant countries are more
skill-intensive in their domestic production than non-offshorers.
3.4 A Many-country Model with a Continuum of Intermediate Inputs
In this section we extend our framework in order to derive a number of additional empirical
implications of our theory. We consider a world composed of three countries that differ in their
relative factor prices, and assume that final-good firms in all countries produce their final varieties
with a continuum of intermediate inputs, each produced with a different skill intensity. In this
extended setup, firms face an offshoring decision which includes (i) whether to offshore or not,
(ii) which range of inputs to offshore, and (iii) from which country of origin.
Here are the changes in the assumptions that we make:
1. There are three countries indexed with j = 1, 2, 3.
2. Firms make final goods by assembling a continuum of intermediate inputs
q (γ) = γ exp
[∫ 1
0
lnx (z) dz
]
, (15)
where γ is firm-specific. x (z) denotes the quantity of intermediate input z used in the production
of the final-good variety.
3. Intermediate inputs are produced with the following Cobb-Douglas technologies:
y (z) =
Z (z)
τ j
h (z)z l (z)1−z , (16)
where y (z) denotes the quantity produced of intermediate input z; Z (z) = z−z (1− z)z−1; and
h (z) and l (z) denote, respectively, the skills and labor allocated to the production of intermediate
input z. Notice that skill intensities are increasing in z.
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Figure 4: Cost function (left panel), offshoring decision (right panel)
4. Firms are now allowed to choose different ranges of offshored intermediates. They have
to incur a fixed cost fo (in terms of the final good Q) per input offshored. Intermediate inputs
are also subject to the variable offshoring cost τ o > 1. For simplicity, we assume for the moment
that τ o is equal across all country pairs.
We choose the wage of unskilled workers in country 2 as the nume´raire: wl2 = 1. The
complexity of the extended model prevents us from solving for the general equilibrium analytically.
We assume wh1 = wl3 > wl2 = wh2 = 1 > wl1 = wh3.
13 We focus on the offshoring decision
of firms located in skill-abundant country 3 – in our empirical section, we will think of France
as country 3. The left panel of Figure 4 plots the logarithm of the unit cost function of input
z if offshored to countries 1 or 2 (inclusive of the variable offshoring cost τ o) and if produced
in-house in country 3. In labor-abundant country 1 unit costs of inputs rise with skill intensity,
whereas in the skill-abundant country 3 unit costs of inputs decrease with skill intensity. The
line is horizontal in the case of the intermediate country 2.14
Following standard Heckscher-Ohlin intuition, countries’ comparative advantages depend on
their relative endowments: labor-abundant country 1 has a comparative advantage in low-z
goods, skill-abundant country 3 has a comparative advantage in high-z goods, and country 2 has
a comparative advantage in the production of goods that are neither too labor-intensive nor too
skill-intensive. By continuity, it is possible to derive cutoff points defining the range of inputs for
13This will be the case if we assume a symmetric world as far as factor endowments are concerned: H1 = L3 <
H2 = L2 < H3 = L1. International differences in relative factor endowments must also be large enough in order
for transport costs not to make trade in inputs prohibitive. In unreported numerical simulations we confirm this
result in general equilibrium.
14These stark results are driven by the model’s symmetry assumption. In a more general model, we would at
least have the same patterns in relative terms.
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which each country has the lowest production costs (inclusive of the variable offshoring cost τ o
from country 3): [0, z12] for country 1, (z12, z23) for country 2, and [z23, 1] for country 3.
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Following the intuition of the two-input model, offshoring decisions will vary by firm within
each country. Given the structure of costs illustrated in the left panel of Figure 4, firms in
country 3 will only find it profitable to offshore inputs that are on average more labor-intensive
than those produced in-house, since offshoring inputs in the range [0, z23) reduces the marginal
cost of country-3 producers of final-good varieties.
The profit function of a country-3 firm can be expressed as
Π [γ, zo3 (γ)] = pi [γ, z
o
3 (γ)]− zo3 (γ)Pfo − Pfe, (17)
with pi [γ, zo3 (γ)] = p [γ, z
o
3 (γ)] q [γ, z
o
3 (γ)] −MC [γ, zo3 (γ)] q [γ, zo3 (γ)] denoting variable profits.
The offshoring decision of an individual producer in country 3 can be represented by a cutoff
input zo3 (γ) ≤ z23 that denotes the most labor-intensive input produced in-house.
The firm-level offshoring patterns that can be derived from the maximization of profit function
(17) constitute the main firm-level predictions of our theory, and share many of the intuitions
we derived in the two-input model: country-3 firms will simply weigh the marginal increase in
variable profits from offshoring a larger range of labor-intensive inputs to more labor-abundant
countries against the marginal cost of doing so. The marginal increase in variable profits from
offshoring decreases with the skill intensity of offshored inputs: the higher the skill intensity, the
lower the difference in unit costs between country 1 and country 3, or between country 2 and
country 3. The marginal cost of offshoring Pfo is invariant to skill intensity. Thus, country-3
firms will always start by offshoring the most labor-intensive inputs to country 1, and sufficiently
productive firms might also source from country 2.
The right panel of Figure 4 plots the marginal increase in variable profits from offshoring
additional inputs and the marginal cost of offshoring against z. The intersection of the two curves
pins down the optimal cutoff zo3 (γ) that defines the range of offshored inputs. In the Appendix
we show ∂pi (γ, zo3) /∂z
o
3 > 0 and ∂
2pi (γ, zo3) /∂z
o
3∂γ > 0. Variable profits pi (γ, z
o
3) increase with
the cutoff zo3 because a larger z
o
3 implies lower marginal costs. A higher productivity γ enhances
this effect, as more productive firms have higher variable profits other things equal. Thus, more
productive (larger) firms will find it optimal to offshore a larger range of intermediate inputs
15For example, input z12 is equally expensive to offshore to countries 1 and 2, whereas inputs z < z12 are cheaper
to offshore to more labor-abundant country 1. Inputs z ∈ (z12, z23) are cheaper to offshore to not-so-labor-abundant
country 2 than to offshore to country 1 or to produce in-house in country 3.
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Figure 5: Offshoring range (left panel), change in offshoring cost (right panel)
(that is, they have a larger zo3), thereby keeping in-house production of the very skill-intensive
inputs only.
Notice the resulting positive correlation between the skill intensity of offshored inputs and
the skill intensity used in-house by the firm. The left panel of Figure 5 illustrates these patterns:
a country-3 firm with a high productivity γ offshores a wider range [0, zo3 (γ)] of intermediate
inputs than a firm with lower productivity γ′ < γ: zo3 (γ′) < zo3 (γ). This makes the average skill
intensity of the range increase in comparison with a low-productivity firm. At the same time,
this implies that the firm produces a more skill-intensive input mix in-house (zo3(γ), 1].
Moreover, note that more productive firms in country 3 will offshore a more skill-intensive
mix of inputs by country. Besides, for a given source country, this input mix will also be more
heterogeneous in terms of skill intensities for more productive firms, as their imports span a
wider range of inputs. Notice also that according to the model the skill-abundant country’s
more productive firms offshore to a set of countries that is more heterogeneous in terms of
skill abundance: highly productive country-3 firms will find it profitable to offshore not only to
country 1, but also to country 2, whereas low-productivity firms may choose not to offshore at
all, or offshore to labor-abundant country 1 only.
Regarding changes in offshoring costs, the Appendix shows that ∂2pi (γ, zo3) /∂z
o
3∂τ
o < 0: as
illustrated in the right panel of Figure 5, a decrease in the variable offshoring cost τ o makes
it more profitable to offshore inputs, thus increasing the optimal range of offshored goods for
country-3 firms. In addition, a decrease in τ o will raise the share of imports in total sales as
imported inputs substitute away in-house produced tasks both through the intensive margin (an
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increase in the volume imported of offshored inputs) and the extensive margin (an increase in
the number of offshored inputs).
As mentioned in the introduction, our theory also has implications about complementarities
across sourcing locations. The two examples that follow illustrate the kinds of arguments one
can build upon our model in this respect. Consider two firms from country 3 with the same
productivity γ. Assume that they face different variable offshoring costs, high or low, for different
ranges of inputs: in particular, let us assume firm 1 has low offshoring costs for the most labor-
intensive decile of inputs whereas firm 2 has low offshoring costs for the second most labor-
intensive decile. Consider a situation in which γ is large enough and both firms offshore these
two ranges of inputs. The resulting decrease in marginal costs is larger for firm 1 than for firm
2. Firm 1’s revenues will be higher, thus making it more likely that it offshores a larger volume
of inputs and to more countries than firm 2, even if offshoring costs for these other countries or
inputs are the same across the two firms.
Consider now a many-(> 3) country world in which the fixed offshoring costs firms face, high
or low, vary by country. Let us assume firm 1 has low fixed offshoring costs vis-a`-vis the most
labor-abundant country. Firm 2, with identical productivity level, has a low fixed offshoring cost
vis-a`-vis some other country. Having a low offshoring cost vis-a`-vis the most labor-abundant
country will give firm 1 a larger cost reduction, thus enabling it to gain size in comparison with
firm 2: firm 1 is therefore more likely to offshore a larger volume of inputs to any given country,
even if offshoring costs for these other countries and inputs are the same across the two firms.
3.5 Summary of Empirical Predictions
A number of testable predictions arise from our theory, which we summarize below. From the
perspective of France, which is a skill-abundant country:
1. There is significant variation in the skill intensity of production across French firms within
a given sector; there is more variation in skill intensity across firms that import from labor-
abundant countries than across non-importing firms.
2. For French firms importing from labor-abundant countries, the skill intensity of imports is
increasing in firm-level productivity.
3. Holding constant a given labor-abundant source country, more productive firms import
more skill-intensive goods from that country compared to less productive ones; in addition, more
productive firms have more variation in the skill intensity of their imports from a given labor-
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abundant country compared to less productive ones.
4. For French firms importing from the set of labor-abundant countries, less productive
ones import only from the most labor-abundant countries, while more productive firms import
also from relatively more skill-abundant countries; moreover, more productive firms have more
variation in the skill abundance of countries from which they import compared to less productive
ones.
5. For French firms importing from the set of labor-abundant countries, holding constant firm-
level productivity, firms importing more labor-intensive products from other import destinations
import a larger volume from a given country of origin; moreover, firms sourcing from more labor-
abundant countries import a larger volume from any given country of origin.
6. French firms that import from the set of labor-abundant countries are more skill-intensive
in their production in France than French non-importers and French firms that import from other
countries.
7. For French firms importing from the set of labor-abundant countries, the skill intensity of
their production in France is increasing in the skill intensity of their imports from those countries.
4 Data
Firm-level Data
Our empirical analysis is based on a detailed French firm-level dataset that we obtain by merging
several administrative data sources using a common firm identifier.
Trade data: Firm-level trade data come from an exhaustive administrative file collected by
the French Customs Office. The yearly value of imports (by country of origin and product)
and exports (by country of destination and product) are reported for all firms over the period
1996-2007.16
Balance sheet data: The administrative BRN dataset (“Be´ne´fices Re´els Normaux”) is con-
structed from tax records and provides balance-sheet information by year. We use data on sales,
employment, material usage, capital stock and main sector of activity at the 5-digit NAF Rev2
level.17 The dataset includes over 60% of French firms. We use the BRN data to estimate
16The data is virtually exhaustive. Flows with non-EU countries whose value is below 1,000 Euros are not in
the dataset. In the case of EU countries, the threshold is larger, varying from 40,000 to 150,000 Euros depending
on the year. These thresholds leave out a very small proportion of French trade flows.
17NAF = French classification of economic activities, the first four digits of which are identical to the NACE
Rev2 classification
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firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion, separately for each 2-digit industry using data on 1,026,147 observations over the period
1994-2009. Our preferred measure uses the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method.
Employment by skill data: We obtain information on the occupational structure at the firm
level using the DADS dataset (“De´claration Annuelle de Donne´es Sociales”). It is constructed
from mandatory employer reports of their workers’ characteristics. For every firm in France
with at least one employee, we have information on the number of workers by year in each of
five categories: 2= Firm owners receiving a wage; 3=Administrative and commercial managers
(includes engineers); 4=Technicians and supervisors; 5=White Collar employees; 6= Production
workers (Blue Collar). Categories are based on the French Nomenclature des professions et
cate´gories socioprofessionnelles, PCS.18 We construct our main measure of skill intensity at the
firm level as the fraction of non-production workers in total employment. The skill ratio of firm
f in year t is
skill ratioft ≡ (2 + 3 + 4 + 5)/(6).
Country- and Product-level Data
We complement our firm-level dataset with the following information:
Country-level human-capital data: We use information on country-level skill abundance from
Barro and Lee (2013) to construct the set of countries which are less skill abundant than France.
Our measure of skill abundance is the number of years of secondary schooling in the population
older than 15. We consider the set of countries that have less than 95 percent of the French level of
secondary education (in the robustness checks in the Online Appendix we consider an 80-percent
threshold). This information is available for the years 2000 and 2005; we use an average of the
two data points. Table A-2 presents the set of countries.19
Product-level skill-intensity data: We use the NBER manufacturing database (Bartelsman and
Gray, 1996; available at http://www.nber.org/nberces/) to construct measures of skill intensity
18The nomenclature underwent a change in 2003. This change only affected the 3-digit disaggregation, while the
1-digit classification we are using remained unchanged. Although this variable refers to occupations, it has often
been used to proxy for the workers’ skill level (e.g., Cahuc et al., 2006). Caliendo et al., forthcoming show that
average wages are inversely linked to the position in the PCS.
19We exclude from the set of these countries any old EU-member countries that fall below these cutoffs. We
do this for two reasons: first, because we do not consider these countries as truely labor-abundant, since they
are all marginal cases; second, in the IV exercise we use EU external tariffs to construct our instrument, so we
cannot include these countries. However, most of the empirical results are robust to including them in the set of
labor-abundant countries. Those countries are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg,
Portugal, Spain and the UK.
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at the product level. The data are available up to 2005. We define skill intensity as the ratio
of non-production to production workers. Both measures are available at the NAICS97 6-digit
level. We map them into HS6 codes using the concordance table provided by Pierce and Schott
(2009). When more than one NAICS97 code maps into a single HS6 code, we take a simple
average. The advantage of using U.S. industry data is that it is exogenous to events in France.
To further avoid endogeneity issues, we use factor intensity in the pre-sample year 1995.
Tariff data: We employ information on EU external tariffs at the importer-product level
to obtain exogenous variation in import flows. We use information on applied tariffs (simple
averages) at the 6-digit HS level from the Worldbank’s WITS database for our sample period.
World export data: We use data from the BACI database (administered by CEPII) to con-
struct exports by HS 6-digit product for each country from which French firms import for the
years 1996 to 2007. We use this information to construct instrumental variables based on supply
shocks in France’s trading partners.
Measuring the Average Skill Intensity of Imports
The skill intensity of firm-level imports is a central measure to our analysis. It is constructed
as follows. Denote the HS6 product-level skill intensity with skillintp, and the share of imports
of product p in firm f ’s total imports from labor-abundant countries in period t as wf,p,t. The
average skill intensity of imports is defined as:
skill intensityf,t =
∑
p∈If,p,t
skillintp × wf,p,t.
sf,t is a firm-level import-share-weighted average of factor intensities. If,p,t is the set of products
which firm f imports from the set of labor-abundant countries in that period. We construct
skillintp using the U.S. industry data described above. The definition of product-level skill
intensity (the ratio of non-production to production workers) corresponds quite closely to our
firm-level measure of skill intensity.
Construction of Instrumental Variables
In our empirical analysis we would like to exploit exogenous variation in offshoring. We thus need
to construct instruments for the value of imports by firm from the set labor- and skill-abundant
countries as well as for the average skill intensity of imports from labor-abundant countries.
According to our model, changes in τ o shift the offshoring threshold zo(γ) and thereby change
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both the value and the average skill intensity of imports from labor-abundant countries. Observe
that changes in τ o capture both changes in offshoring costs (including import tariffs) and foreign
export supply shocks. Hence, we construct two types of instruments for the endogenous variables
which exploit this variation.
Export supply shock instruments. The first set of instruments for imports is based on world
export supply shocks, following recent work by Autor et al. (2013). These instruments are
based on the following idea: an increase in world exports of product p by country c reflects a
shock in country c’s competitiveness for this product (due, for example, to exogenous variation
in productivity, costs or product quality). French firms importing product p from country c
would respond to this shock by increasing their imports of this product from this specific origin.
Exogeneity is ensured by the fact that supply shocks in foreign countries are exogenous to firm-
level decisions in France. To construct such firm-specific instruments, we rely on Hummels et
al. (2014). For each firm, we compute the share of each (HS6) product-country pair in total
imports in the first year the firm appears in the sample in order to avoid endogeneity concerns
and then take an import-share weighted average of foreign export supply shocks. Specifically, let
Xp,c,t be the export supply of product p by country c in period t (excluding exports to France)
and let wf,p,c,0 be the share of imports of product p from country c in firm f ’s imports from
labor-abundant countries in the first period the firm is in the sample. Then the firm-specific
instrument for the value of imports from labor-abundant countries is constructed as
ˆimportsf,t,1 =
∑
c∈If,c,0
∑
p∈If,p,0
wf,p,c,0 ×Xp,c,t,
where If,c,0 and If,p,0 is the set of countries and products a given firm imports in the first year
it is in the sample. Observe that all the time variation in the instrument is due to exogenous
export supply-shocks. Moreover, given that we use initial imports as weights, the instrument
operates only through the intensive margin of imports. We construct an instrument for the
value of imports from skill-abundant countries in an analogous way. In addition, we construct
a supply-shock based instrument for the average skill intensity of imports from labor-abundant
countries. This instrument is defined as an initial import-shares × supply-shock weighted average
of product-level skill intensities.
ˆskill intensityf,t,1 =
∑
p∈If,p,0
skillintp ×
 ∑
c∈If,c,0
wf,p,c,0 ×Xp,c,t
 .
23
Again, all the time variation in the instrument arises from country-product-specific supply shocks.
The quality of the instruments requires a firm-specific set of potential markets which is stable
over time, two conditions that are met in our data.20
Tariff instrument. Our second type of instrument exploits tariff reductions from the Uruguay
round of multilateral trade liberalization, which was concluded in 1994 and implemented up to
the early 2000s. Tariff reductions should increase offshoring to labor-abundant countries and
provides exogenous variation in imports from these countries.21
To construct a tariff-based instrument for the average skill intensity of imports from labor-
abundant countries, we first take a given set of firm-country-product pairs and regress the (log)
value of imports of product p from country c of firm f on the log of the applied EU external tariff
log(tariffp,c,t) as well as firm, product and country fixed effects:
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log(imports)f,p,c,t = β0 + β1 log(tariffp,c,t) + δf + δp + δc + f,p,c,t.
We then obtain predicted values from this regression, ˆlog(importf,p,c,t) These are import values
explained by firm, product and country means, as well as tariffs. Observe that, given that we hold
the set of products and countries constant, all the time variation in predicted import values comes
from changes in tariffs. Next, we sum predicted imports across countries to obtain firm-product-
time specific weights wˆf,p,t =
∑
c
ˆimportf,p,c,t∑
p
∑
c
ˆimportf,p,c,t
. Finally, we multiply these with product-specific
skill-intensities and sum over products to obtain the tariff-predicted average skill intensity of
imports of a given firm in a given year:
ˆskill intensityf,t,2 =
∑
p∈If,p,t
skillintp × wˆf,p,t.
20Carluccio et al. (2015) provide detailed evidence in favor of these points for the firms in our sample.
21As a result of multilateral trade negotiations, the European Union reduced its average applied most-favored-
nation tariffs in manufacturing by around 3 percentage points (see Finger et. al, 1996), with a lot of variation
across products. Most of these tariff reductions were implemented in the late 1990s. Moreover, during the same
period substantial bilateral tariff reductions with several Eastern European countries took place. This was a
consequence of the association agreements predating their accession to the EU – Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia became EU members in 2004, Bulgaria
and Romania followed in 2007. Tariff reductions generally started in the early 1990s and were implemented in
several steps until the early 2000s. Finally, the EU also signed several bilateral free trade agreements during our
sample period which lead to further tariff reductions.
22The estimated coefficient of log(tariffp,c,t) for the set of countries with less than 95 percent of the French level
of secondary schooling is -0.029 and significant at the one-percent level, implying that a 100 percent higher tariff
reduces imports of a given product by a given firm by around 2 percent.
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Estimating Sample
We restrict the sample to firms in manufacturing and we only consider imports of manufactured
goods.23 The estimating sample so obtained is an unbalanced panel covering 1996 to 2007 with
646,920 firm/year observations corresponding to 104,036 firms. Of these, 13,343 import at least
once from the set of countries with less than 95 percent of the French level of secondary schooling
in the population.24 Table A-1 presents summary statistics of firm-level variables.
5 Empirical Results
In this section we present evidence for the empirical predictions derived from our model. We
have already provided empirical evidence for Prediction 1 – which states that there is significant
within-sector variation in firm-level skill ratios – in the section on descriptive statistics. We
therefore start with testing Prediction 2.
5.1 Empirical Predictions 2-5: Productivity, the Skill Intensity and the Origin
of Imports
Prediction 2 states that, for firms importing from labor-abundant countries, the average skill
intensity of these imports should be increasing in firm-level productivity. The regression specifi-
cation is as follows:
skill intensityf,t = β0 + β1 log(TFP )f,t−1 + β2Xf,t + f,t. (18)
skillintensityf,t is the average skill intensity of imports from the set of labor-abundant countries,
log(TFP )f,t−1 is the one-period lag of firm-level log TFP and Xf,t is a vector of control variables,
which – depending on the specification – includes either 4-digit sector fixed effects or firm fixed
effects. We always include year fixed effects. In addition, to control for other factors that might
be correlated both with the average skill intensity of imports and productivity, we add the number
of employees, the capital/labor ratio, the value of exports and the value of imports (all in logs)
in some specifications.
23We keep firms in the two-digit NACE Rev2 industries 10-33, with the exception of natural resource-based codes
12 (Manufacture of tobacco products) and 19 (Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products). We exclude
imports of raw materials (HS01-15, 23, 25-27, 31 and 41) and services (HS97-99). Excluded import flows account
for around 5% of total imports over the period.
24To mitigate measurement error, we consider firms as importers when they import for at least two consecutive
years.
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The results are reported in Table 3. In columns (1) and (2), we present results including
4-digit sector fixed effects, which exploit the cross-section variation of the data. By contrast, in
columns (3) and (4), we focus on the within-firm variation by including firm fixed effects. We
always cluster standard errors at the firm level. In all regressions, the coefficient of log TFP is
positive and highly statistically significant, confirming our theoretical prediction. This result is
robust to including further controls.
Dependent variable is average skill intensity of importsft
from countries ≤ 95 percent of French sec. schooling
(1) (3) (2) (4)
log(TFP)f,t−1 0.0086*** 0.0052*** 0.0045*** 0.0037**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(employees)f,t -0.0032*** 0.0027
(0.001) (0.002)
log(capital/labor)f,t 0.0021*** 0.0021
(0.001) (0.002)
log(exports)f,t -0.0007** 0.0005
(0.000) (0.000)
log(imports)f,t 0.0046*** 0.0017**
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 55,333 55,333 55,333 55,333
Firms 13,297 13,297 13,297 13,297
Firm FE NO NO YES YES
4-digit Sector FE YES YES NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm
R-squared 0.3152 0.3183 0.0042 0.0046
Table 3: Skill intensity of imports from labor-abundant countries and productivity
The dependent variable is the average skill intensity of imports from labor-abundant countries at the firm level (see
the data section for an explanation of the construction of this variable). We consider imports from countries with
less than 95 percent of the French level of secondary schooling. The main explanatory variable of interest is the
one-year lag of firm-level productivity computed with the Levinsohn-Petrin method, log(TFP )f,t. Other controls
are (all at the firm level and in logs): the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the value of exports
and imports.
Next, we investigate the precise microeconomic channels that lead to the positive correla-
tion between firm-level productivity and the average skill intensity of firms’ imports from labor-
abundant countries. In particular, our model predicts that, when considering importers from a
specific labor-abundant country, more productive firms should import a more skill-intensive mix
of products from that country compared to less productive ones (Prediction 3, Part 1). To test
this hypothesis, we run the following gravity regression:
log(imports)f,p,c,t = β0 + β1 log(TFP )f,t + β2skillintp+ (19)
+ β3 log(TFP )f,t ∗ skillintp + β4Xf,c,t + f,p,c,t,
where log(imports)f,p,c,t is the (log) import value of product p from country c by firm f in
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year t, log(TFP )f,t is log TFP, skillintp is the skill intensity of product p and the vector Xf,c,t
always includes country and year fixed effects. Depending on the specification, it also includes
employment, the capital-labor ratio and the value of exports (all in logs). Observe that, by
including country and year fixed effects, we exploit the within-country, cross-section variation
across firms and products.
We expect the coefficient on skill intensity, β2, to be negative, since the comparative advantage
of labor-abundant countries is in labor-intensive sectors. More importantly, we expect β3, the
interaction term between product-level skill intensity and firm-level TFP, to be positive. We
report the results for these regressions in the first two columns of Table 4. As expected, in both
specifications, the coefficient on skill intensity is negative, while the interaction term between
product-level skill intensity and log TFP is positive and statistically highly significant. This
confirms the hypothesis that more productive firms import more skill-intensive products from a
given labor-abundant country.
Our theory also predicts that all firms offshoring to those countries should import the relatively
labor-intensive products. We thus expect more productive importers to have a larger variation
in the skill intensity of the products that they import from a given country (Prediction 3, part
2). In order to test this prediction, we compute for each firm the dispersion of the skill intensity
of its imports from any given labor-abundant country.
As our measure of skill dispersion, we consider the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile of
skill intensity of products imported by a given firm from a given country.25 We then regress this
measure of skill dispersion on firm-level productivity (averaged over all years the firm is in the
sample). The regression specification is:
dispersionf,c = β0 + β1 log(TFP )f + β2Xf,c + f,c. (20)
Here, the vector of controls includes our standard set of firm-level controls (averaged over periods)
and the number of products a given firm imports from a given country (in logs). We include the
last variable in order to avoid any confusion with the mechanical result that firms sampling more
products randomly from a given country will have a larger dispersion in the skill intensity of their
sampled products. Results are reported in the first two columns of Table 5. In all specifications,
the coefficient of log(TFP) enters positively and is strongly statistically significant, which is
25Using other measures of dispersion, such as the standard deviation or the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile
gives very similar results.
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consistent with our hypothesis.
We now turn to the next theoretical prediction. Prediction 4 states that out of the set of
labor-abundant countries, only sufficiently productive firms will find it profitable to import not
only from the very labor-abundant countries but also from the relatively more skill-abundant
ones. To test this prediction, we change the specification of our gravity regression as follows:
log(imports)f,p,c,t = β0 + β1 log(TFP )f,t + β2sec.schoolingc+ (21)
+ β3 log(TFP )f,t ∗ sec.schoolingc + β4Xf,c,t + f,p,c,t,
where sec.schoolingc is the skill abundance (measured in terms of years of secondary schooling)
of country c relative to France and where the vector Xf,c,t always includes year fixed effects.
Depending on the specification, it also includes our standard set of firm-specific controls and a
set of country-specific gravity controls (distance from France, GDP, GDP per capita, area (all in
logs), dummies for common language, common border, colony).
We expect the coefficient of sec.schoolingc, β2, to enter negatively – since cost advantages
of importing from relatively more skill-abundant countries are smaller. Moreover, we expect the
interaction term between sec.schoolingc and log(TFP )f,t, β3, to have a positive coefficient, since
only sufficiently productive firms will import from more skill-abundant countries. Results for this
specification are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. In both specifications, sec.schoolingc
enters negatively and is statistically strongly significant. More importantly, the interaction term
between sec.schoolingc and log(TFP )f,t is always positive and mostly highly significant. This
confirms our theoretical prediction that out of the set of labor-abundant countries, more produc-
tive firms import from more skill-abundant ones.
The second part of Prediction 4 states that more productive firms should have more variation
in the skill abundance of countries from which they import compared to less productive ones. As
our measure of skill-abundance dispersion, we consider the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile
of skill abundance of those countries from which a given firm imports (out of the set of labor-
abundant countries). We then regress this measure of skill-abundance dispersion on firm-level
productivity (averaged over all years the firm is in the sample). The regression specification is:
dispersionf = β0 + β1 log(TFP )f + β2Xf + f . (22)
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Here, the vector Xf includes our standard set of firm-level controls (averaged over periods) as
well as the number of countries from which a given firm imports (in logs). We include the last
variable in order to avoid any confusion with the purely mechanical result that firms sampling
more countries randomly have a larger dispersion in skill abundance of their sampled countries.
Results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. In all specifications, the coefficient of
log(TFP) enters positively and is strongly statistically significant, which is consistent with our
hypothesis.
Finally, we turn to the results on complementarity of import decisions across source countries.
Prediction 5 states that for importers from the set of labor-abundant countries – holding constant
productivity – firms importing more labor-intensive products from other source countries import
more from a given country. Moreover, firms importing from a more labor-abundant mix of source
countries import more from a given country. To test these predictions, for each firm-product-
country we compute the skill intensity of imports of other products from other labor-abundant
countries (measured as a simple average) and the skill-abundance of the other import origin
countries (measured again as a simple average over the levels of secondary schooling).26 We then
consider the following regression specifications:
log(imports)f,p,c,t = β0 + β1 log(TFP )f,t + β2skillintp + β3 log(TFP )f,t ∗ skillintp+ (23)
+ β4skillint other productsf,p,t + β5Xf,c,t + f,p,c,t,
where Xf,c,t contains the total number of other imported products, our usual set of firm-specific
controls, country and year fixed effects and
log(imports)f,p,c,t = β0 + β1 log(TFP )f,t + β2sec.schoolingc + +β3 log(TFP )f,t ∗ sec.schoolingc
(24)
+ β4sec. schooling other countriesf,c,t + β5Xf,c,t + f,p,c,t,
where Xf,c,t contains the total number of other source countries, our usual set of firm-specific
controls, year fixed effects, as well as bilateral gravity controls. In both specifications, we expect
β4 to be negative, indicating that firms importing a set of more skill-intensive (other) products or
26Results are robust to considering instead an import share-weighted average of skill intensity or skill abundance.
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from more skill-abundant (other) countries import less from a given country of origin compared
to firms importing relatively more labor-intensive products or from labor-abundant countries.
The results are presented in columns (5)-(8) of Table 4. In all cases, β4 has the expected negative
sign and is highly statistically significant, while the other coefficients remain unaffected by the
inclusion of the new variables. We thus conclude that there is strong evidence for complemen-
tarities across sourcing countries, with cost reductions being larger for imports of labor-intensive
products and imports originating in labor-abundant countries.27
The above results have focused on the specific hypotheses regarding import behavior from
labor-abundant countries and productivity. We have shown that the predicted relationships be-
tween product-level skill intensity, country-level skill abundance and productivity hold in the data.
Next, we show that importing from labor-abundant countries is also associated with significantly
higher skill ratios of production in France.
27Since one may be concerned that firm productivity is endogenous to import decisions, in unreported regressions
we consider TFP in the initial period instead of contemporaneous values. We find that all the results for predictions
3-5 are robust to this change.
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dependent variable is log(imports)f,p,c,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(TFP)f,t -0.6285*** -0.6759*** -0.5258*** -0.6665*** -0.5703*** -0.5715*** -0.5132*** -0.6061***
(0.075) (0.069) (0.062) (0.068) (0.069) (0.065) (0.061) (0.067)
skill intensityp -4.6065*** -4.0837*** -4.6329*** -3.3129***
(0.933) (0.840) (0.978) (0.876)
log(TFP)f,t* 1.1818*** 0.8979*** 1.2176*** 0.7898***
skill intensityp (0.244) (0.220) (0.257) (0.228)
sec. schoolingc -1.9766*** -1.3182** -2.1721*** -1.4817**
(0.549) (0.615) (0.571) (0.622)
log(TFP)f,t* 0.2956** 0.3268* 0.3356** 0.3444**
sec. schoolingc (0.150) (0.169) (0.154) (0.170)
skill intensity other productsf,p,t -0.5934** -1.7194***
(0.285) (0.286)
sec. schooling other countriesf,c,t -0.6033*** -0.9823***
(0.106) (0.106)
log(employees)f,t 0.0733** 0.0739** 0.1601*** 0.1732***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.024) (0.031)
log(capital/labor)f,t 0.0950*** 0.1079*** 0.0751** 0.0850**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.036)
log(exports)f,t 0.2390*** 0.2310*** 0.2332*** 0.2413***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
# productsf,t -0.0022 -0.0049**
(0.002) (0.002)
#countriesf,t -0.0044 -0.0294***
(0.008) (0.010)
Observations 666,427 666,427 683,820 605,261 649,483 649,483 628,637 553,897
Country FE YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gravity Controls NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
R-squared 0.0096 0.0399 0.0219 0.0534 0.0116 0.0492 0.0238 0.0633
Observations 666,427 666,427 683,820 605,261 649,483 649,483 628,637 553,897
R-squared 0.0096 0.0399 0.0219 0.0534 0.0116 0.0492 0.0238 0.0633
Table 4: Imports from labor-abundant countries and skill-intensity/skill-abundance interactions with productivity
The dependent variable is log imports from labor-abundant countries at the firm-product-country-year level. We consider imports from countries with less than
95 percent of the French level of secondary schooling. The main explanatory variable of interest in columns (1)-(2) is the interaction between product-level skill
intensity (skill intensityp) and firm-level productivity computed with the Levinsohn-Petrin method (log(TFP )f,t). The main explanatory variable of interest in
columns (3)-(4) is the interaction between country-level skill abundance (sec. schoolingc) and firm-level productivity (log(TFP )f,t). The main variable of interest
in columns (5)-(6) is the skill-intensity of products imported from other destinations. The main variable of interest in columns (7)-(8) is the skill abundance of the
other source countries. Other controls are (all at the firm level and in logs): the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio, the value of exports, the number of
products a given firm imports, the number of countries from which a given firm imports. Some specifications also include gravity controls (GDP, GDP per capita,
distance, area, dummies for border common language, colony).
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dependent variable is 75th/25th percentile ratio of
product skill-intensityf,c country skill-abundancef
countries ≤ 95 percent of French sec. schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(TFP)f 0.0172*** 0.0577*** 0.0858*** 0.0459***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.014) (0.003)
log(employees)f 0.0168*** 0.0110***
(0.002) (0.001)
log(capital/labor)f -0.0203*** 0.0316***
(0.003) (0.001)
log(exports)f 0.0079*** -0.0133***
(0.001) (0.001)
log(# products)f,c 0.0398***
(0.003)
log(# countries)f 0.0893***
(0.002)
Observations 91,919 91,919 23,243 23,243
R-squared 0.0015 0.0294 0.1980 0.2250
Robust s.e. YES YES YES YES
Table 5: Dispersion of product skill intensity/country skill-abundance and firm-level productivity
The dependent variable is the ratio of 75th to the 25th percentile of product-level skill intensity by import country
and firm (in columns (1)-(2)) and the ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile of the exporting countries’ secondary
schooling endowments by firm (in columns (3)-(4)). We consider imports from countries with less than 95 percent
of the French level of secondary schooling. The main explanatory variable of interest is log firm-level productivity
averaged over the sample period computed with the Levinsohn-Petrin method (log(TFP )f ). Other controls are
(all at the firm level and in logs): the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio, the value of exports, the total
number of products imported from a given country and the number of countries from which a given firm imports.
5.2 Empirical Predictions 6 and 7: Imports and the Skill Ratio of Production
in France
Prediction 6 states that importers from labor-abundant countries are more skill intensive in their
production in France compared to other firms (French non-importers and importers from skill-
abundant countries). The regression specification is:
log(skillratio)f,t = β0 + β1Imports Below Thresholdf,t+ (25)
+ β2Imports Above Thresholdf,t + β3Xf,t + f,t,
where Imports Below Thresholdf,t is either a dummy for importing from the set of labor-abundant
countries (extensive margin) or the ratio of imports from labor-abundant countries relative to total
sales (intensive margin). Similarly, Imports Above Thresholdf,t is either a dummy for importing
from the set of skill-abundant countries, or the ratio of imports from skill-abundant countries to
total sales. The vector Xf,t includes either 4-digit sector or firm fixed effects, as well as year fixed
effects. Depending on the specification, it also includes employment, the capital-labor ratio (all
in logs) and controls for exporting.
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We present results for the extensive margin in the first four columns of Table 6. The dummy
for importing from labor-abundant countries captures the relative skill ratio of production in
France of importers from labor-abundant countries compared to non-importers. In columns (1)
and (2), we report specifications including 4-digit sector fixed effects, so these specifications use
the cross-section variation in the data. Importers from labor-abundant countries are around 22
percent28 (column (1)) to 28.3 percent (column (2)) more skill-intensive in their production in
France than non-importers and this effect is statistically highly significant. This contrasts with
importers from skill-abundant countries, which are only marginally different from non-importers
in terms of their skill ratios (around 3.6 percent less skill-intensive (column (1))).29 In columns
(3) and (4), we report results including firm fixed effects, thereby identifying the dummies for
importing via within-firm changes in import status: the result in column (3) indicates that firms
that start importing from labor-abundant countries simultaneously increase their skill ratio by
around 4 percent, while those that start importing from skill-abundant countries decrease it
slightly (by around 1.2 percent). Observe that all results are robust to controlling for TFP, the
capital-labor ratio and the export status. Focusing on the within-firm results, exporting has a
significantly positive effect on the skill ratio of production, while TFP has a small negative effect
conditional on firms’ import status from labor-abundant countries.30
We now consider instead the intensive margin of imports, and define our regressor of interest
as firms’ imports from the set of labor-abundant countries normalized by sales. We do this in
order to avoid a downward bias in our estimates since the import dummy also includes firms
that are only marginal importers. Moreover, according to our theoretical model, an increase
in imports over sales should lead to an increase in the domestic skill ratio. Again, in order
to allow for a differential effect of importing from skill-abundant countries, we include as a
separate regressor firm-level imports from skill-abundant countries normalized by sales. Results
are reported in columns (5)-(8) of Table 6. In columns (5) and (6) we include all firms (including
non-importers), while in columns (7) and (8) we restrict the sample to importers from both sets
of countries. For the sake of space, we only present specifications including firm and year fixed
effects. The result in column (5) indicates that a one-unit increase in the ratio of imports from
2822=100*(exp(0.1996)-1)
29Observe that while at first glance this result seems to be add odds with our model, which predicts that firms
importing from more skill-abundant countries are more labor-intensive than non-importers, this is actually not
the case: within the set of skill-abundant countries, France has roughly the average skill abundance and the most
skill-abundant countries have a level of secondary schooling which is only 1.2 times larger than that of France.
Thus, one would not expect importing from these countries to have a large negative effect on the skill ratio of their
domestic production.
30Note that the unconditional within-firm correlation between TFP and the log skill ratio is positive.
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labor-abundant countries relative to sales increases the skill ratio of production in France by
around 25 percent and is highly significant. This effect contrasts with the impact of importing
from skill-abundant countries, where a one-unit increase in the imports-to-sales ratio reduces the
firm-level skill ratio by a comparatively much smaller and insignificant 0.86 percent. Finally, the
results for the sample of importers (columns (5)-(8)) are very similar to those obtained for the full
sample of firms. We conclude that there is strong evidence that importing from labor-abundant
countries is associated with large increases in the skill ratio of production in France.31
Instrumental Variable Estimates
Finally, we turn to the instrumental variables results. We need to instrument both for im-
ports/sales from labor-abundant and from skill-abundant countries. We thus use supply-shock
instruments to obtain exogenous variation in imports.32 Since the supply shock instruments
provide exogenous time variation in imports for a given firm, we report results for the 2-stage-
least-square regressions with firm and year fixed effects for the sample of importers in Table
7.
Focusing first on the first-stage regressions, we find that the shocks have the expected signs
and are significant at the one-percent level. The Angrist-Pischke F-statistic is always above 13 for
the first-stage regressions with imports/sales below the threshold as dependent variable and above
10 when imports/sales above the threshold is instrumented, indicating that weak instruments are
not a problem. Turning now to the second-stage results, the point estimate for the coefficient for
importing from labor-abundant countries is now 5.51 (compared to 0.25 for the OLS estimator).
This large increase in the magnitude of the coefficient is likely due to measurement error in
the time variation of imports, which biases fixed effects results towards zero.33 The coefficient
for imports from skill-abundant countries is instead negative and also large (-4.28 compared
to -0.009 for the OLS estimator) and now it is also statistically significant. These results are
robust to adding the standard set of controls. The IV estimates imply large economic effects
of importing from labor-abundant countries. For the estimating sample, the average skill ratio
changed by around 0.86 log points between 1996 and 2007. Evaluating the estimates for the effect
31In unreported regressions we have also regressed the employment of skilled and unskilled workers separately
on imports relative to sales from labor-abundant countries. Within-firm results indicate that firms which increase
imports from labor-abundant countries reduce blue-collar employment and increase employment of skilled workers.
Moreover, as our model suggests, these firms simultaneously increase their sales.
32Unfortunately, we cannot construct tariff-based instruments for imports because the set of skill-abundant
countries consist mostly of EU members, which have no tariff barriers vis-a`-vis France.
33Hummels et al. (2014) find a similar increase in the magnitude of their point estimates when instrumenting
for the effect of offshoring on wages of Danish workers using supply shocks.
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of importing from labor-abundant countries at the mean of imports/sales below the threshold,
we find that the skill ratio should have changed by around 0.093 log points, which corresponds
to slightly more than the total actual change in the log skill ratio.34 Thus, offshoring to labor-
abundant countries can potentially explain the bulk of the observed within-firm increase in the
skill ratio of importers.
We now turn to the last theoretical prediction of our model. Prediction 7 states that the
average skill intensity of imports from the set of labor-abundant countries should be positively
correlated with the skill ratio of firms’ production in France. We thus regress the (log) skill ratio
of firms’ production on the average skill intensity of their imports from labor-abundant countries.
We focus on the following empirical specification:
log(skillratio)f,t = β0 + β1skill intensityf,t + β2Xf,t + f,t, (26)
where skill intensityf,t is the average skill intensity of imports from the set of labor-abundant
countries and Xf,t is our vector of standard controls (sector or firm and year fixed effects as well
as employment, the capital-labor ratio, the value of imports and the value of exports (all in logs).)
The results for this specification are presented in columns (1)-(4) of Table 8. In columns (1)
and (2), we report results for a specification including 4-digit sector-fixed effects. The result in
column (1) indicates that a one-unit increase in the average skill intensity of imports is associated
with a 46-percent increase in the skill ratio and is highly significant. Adding further controls in
column (2) leaves the results unaffected.
34Average imports/sales from countries below the 95 percent threshold increased from 0.053 to 0.07 from 1996
to 2007, thus the effect is given by 5.51*(0.07-0.053)=0.093.
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dependent variable is log(skill ratio)ft; countries ≤ 95 percent of French sec. schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
import status 0.1996*** 0.2497*** 0.0388*** 0.0437***
below thresholdf,t (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
imports/sales 0.2500*** 0.2352*** 0.2152** 0.1697**
below thresholdf,t (0.096) (0.090) (0.099) (0.083)
import status -0.0349*** -0.0034 -0.0124*** 0.0024
above thresholdf,t (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
imports/sales -0.0086 -0.0083 -0.0231 -0.0346**
above thresholdf,t (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.017)
log(TFP)f,t 0.3919*** -0.0112*** -0.0124*** 0.0048
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
log(employees)f,t -0.1805*** -0.1709*** -0.1721*** -0.2365***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.024)
log(capital/labor)f,t 0.0235*** -0.0183*** -0.0186*** -0.0481***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016)
export statusf,t 0.1386*** 0.0157***
(0.006) (0.003)
log(exports)f,t 0.0077*** 0.0107***
(0.001) (0.004)
Observations 646,920 646,920 646,920 646,920 646,920 646,920 55,719 55,719
Firms 104,036 104,036 104,036 104,036 104,036 104,036 12,714 12,714
Sample all all all all all all importers importers
Firm FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
4-digit sector FE YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
R-squared 0.2039 0.2510 0.0040 0.0111 0.0042 0.0114 0.0465 0.0612
Table 6: Skill ratio of production and importing from labor-abundant countries (extensive and intensive margin).
The dependent variable is the firm-level (log) skill ratio of production, defined as the ratio of non-production workers to production workers. We consider imports
from countries with less than 95 percent of the French level of secondary schooling. In columns (1)-(4), the main explanatory variable of interest is a dummy for
importing from the set of labor-abundant countries (import status below threshold). The specifications also include a dummy for importing from the set of skill-
abundant countries (import status above threshold). In columns (5)-(8), the main explanatory variable of interest is the ratio of imports from set of labor-abundant
countries relative to sales (import/sales below threshold). The specifications also include the ratio of imports from the set of skill-abundant countries relative to
sales (imports/sales above threshold). Other controls are (all at the firm level and in logs): TFP (constructed with the Levinsohn-Petrin method), the number of
employees, the capital-labor ratio and the value of exports.
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First Stage Dep. var.: imports/sales Dep. var.: imports/sales Second Stage Dep. var.: log(skill ratio)f,t
below thresholdf,t above thresholdf,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Supply Shock (below) 0.0026*** 0.0024*** 0.0027* 0.0024 imports/sales (below) 5.5135** 4.8961*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0016) (2.760) (2.704)
IV Supply Shock (above) -0.0053* -0.0049* 0.0066** 0.0065** imports/sales (above) -4.2816* -3.7129
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0027) (2.376) (2.279)
log(TFP)f,t -0.0081*** -0.0135*** log(TFP)f,t -0.0057
(0.0022) (0.0029) (0.040)
log(employees)f,t -0.0270*** -0.0174*** log(employees)f,t -0.1696**
(0.0032) (0.0059) (0.086)
log(capital/labor)f,t -0.0031 0.0037 log(capital/labor)f,t -0.0186
(0.0026) (0.0028) (0.025)
log(exports)f,t 0.0087*** 0.0099*** log(exports)f,t 0.0064
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.034)
F-statistic (Angrist-Pischke) 15,32 13,72 11,57 10,25
Observations 52,766 52,766 52,766 52,766 52,766 52,766
Firms 9,761 9,761 9,761 9,761 9,761 9,761
Sample importers importers importers importers importers importers
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table 7: Skill ratio of production and importing from labor-abundant countries (IV estimates).
The dependent variable in the second-stage regression (columns (5)-(6)) is the firm-level (log) skill ratio of production, defined as the ratio of non-production workers
to production workers. The main explanatory variable of interest is the ratio of imports from set of labor-abundant countries relative to sales (import/sales below
threshold). The specifications also include the ratio of imports from the set of skill-abundant countries relative to sales (imports/sales above threshold). We consider
imports from countries with less than 95 percent of the French level of secondary schooling. Other controls are (all at the firm level and in logs): TFP (constructed
with the Levinsohn-Petrin method), the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the value of exports. Both imports/sales below and above threshold are
considered endogenous. Instruments are constructed from foreign supply-shocks (see data section for an explanation). First-stage regressions are reported in columns
(1)-(4). We present Angrist-Pischke F-statistics for the joint significance of instruments with multiple endogenous variables.
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dependent variable is log(skill ratio)f,t
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
skill intensity 0.3791*** 0.2572*** 0.0340 0.0395 0.4184* 0.4078* 0.4156** 0.4049**
importsf,t (0.069) (0.064) (0.029) (0.029) (0.185) (0.183) (0.185) (0.184)
log(TFP)f,t 0.5478*** -0.0058 -0.0079 -0.0078
(0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
log(employees)f,t -0.1913*** -0.2521*** -0.2635*** -0.2639***
(0.010) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
log(capital/labor)f,t -0.0590*** -0.0603*** -0.0602*** -0.0602***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
log(imports)f,t 0.0622*** 0.0240*** 0.0294*** 0.0294***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
log(exports)f,t 0.0331*** 0.0059* 0.0059 0.0060
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 55,528 55,528 55,528 55,528 46,063 46,063 46,063 46,063
Firms 13,343 13,343 13,343 13,343 8,856 8,856 8,856 8,856
Firm FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
4-digit sector FE YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
R-squared 0.2644 0.3405 0.0419 0.0570 0.0390 0.0556 0.0391 0.0558
First-stage regression: dependent variable is skill content of importsf,t
tariff predicted skill intensityf,t 0.3806*** 0.3802*** 0.3827*** 0.3823***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
supply-shock predicted skill intensityf,t -0,0016 -0,0016
(0.0022) (0.0022)
F-statistic 420.43 418.98 212.86 212.13
Hansen J statistic (p-value) n.a. n.a. 0.95 0.81
Table 8: Skill ratio of production and the skill intensity of imports from labor-abundant countries: OLS and IV estimates.
Columns (1)-(4) present OLS estimates and columns (5)-(6) present IV estimates. The main explanatory variable of interest is the average skill intensity of imports
from labor-abundant countries. For an explanation of the construction of this variable see the data description. We consider imports from countries with less than
95 percent of the French level of secondary schooling (see the appendix for the results obtained using a 80 percent cutoff). Other controls are (all at the firm level
and in logs): TFP (constructed with the Levinsohn-Petrin method), the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio, the value of imports and the value of exports.
The skill content of imports is considered endogenous. The instruments are the tariff-predicted skill intensity of imports (columns 5 and 6) and the supply-shock
predicted skill intensity of imports (columns (7) and (8)). See the data section for a discussion of the IV strategy. We report F-statistics for the joint significance of
the instruments and the P-value for the Hansen over-identification test in (H0: instruments uncorrelated with the residuals).
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We now turn to the results including firm fixed effects, which are reported in columns (3) and
(4). Again, we find a positive partial correlation between the average skill intensity of imports
and the (log) skill ratio. The estimates imply that a one-unit increase in firms’ skill intensity of
imports increases the skill ratio of production by around 3.46 percent but are not statistically
significant. However, note that the fixed-effects estimates are again likely to be downward-biased
since changes in the skill intensity of imports are subject to substantial measurement error. We
will correct for this below by employing an IV strategy. Finally, observe that the estimates are
unaffected by adding further controls and that TFP is no longer significant when including firm
fixed effects. This is consistent with our theoretical model, which implies that productivity is
a sufficient statistic for the skill intensity of imports, so an increase in productivity should not
have any separate effect on the skill ratio of production besides the one that operates via the skill
intensity of imports.
Instrumental Variable Estimates
Finally, we use the tariff-predicted skill intensity of imports as well as the supply-shock predicted
skill intensity of imports from labor-abundant countries as instruments for the actual skill inten-
sity of imports from these countries. The results of the two-stage-least-squares regressions with
firm and time fixed effects are reported in columns (5)-(8) of Table 8. We first present regressions
with the tariff-predicted skill intensity as the sole instrument in columns (5) and (6).
In the lower panel of the table, we present the first-stage coefficients for the regression of
the skill intensity of imports on the tariff predicted skill intensity and the F-statistic for the
excluded instrument. The first-stage coefficient for the tariff-predicted skill intensity of imports
is around 0.38 and always significant at the one-percent level. Thus, the partial correlation of
the instrument with the endogenous variable is positive and very strong. The F-statistics of the
excluded instrument are extremely high, so weak instruments are not a concern.
Focusing now on the second-stage regressions (reported in the upper panel of the table), we
find that the coefficient on the skill intensity of imports for the specifications with firm fixed
effects is around 0.4, which is 10 times larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. Moreover,
in contrast to the OLS estimates, the coefficients are all highly statistically significant. The fact
that the IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates is again plausibly due to an attenuation
bias that stems from measurement error in the skill intensity of imports.
In columns (7) and(8) we use both instruments in the first stage and present over-identified
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results. Observe that the supply-shock instrument is not significant in the first stage, while the
tariff instrument continues to be highly significant. Not surprisingly, the point estimates in the
second stage are very similar to the specifications which use only the tariff instruments, since
the regressions are effectively identified mostly through the tariff instrument. Finally, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of the over-identification test that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term. Thus, the IV results confirm a causal positive effect of the skill intensity of
imports from labor-abundant countries on the skill ratio of production in France.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a factor-proportions theory of offshoring with heterogeneous
firms. From the perspective of a skill-abundant country, high-productivity firms self-select into
offshoring relatively labor-intensive inputs from labor-abundant countries, while producing skill-
intensive ones domestically. This leads to within-industry variation in skill intensity of production,
with skill intensity correlating positively with productivity. A reduction in offshoring costs implies
an increase in the skill-intensity of domestic production, as the marginal input that can be prof-
itably offshored becomes more skill intensive. Moreover, our theory generates precise predictions
on firm-level import patterns: first, more productive offshorers will source relatively more skill-
intensive inputs from labor-abundant countries than less productive ones; second, out of the set
of labor-abundant countries, they will also source from relatively more skill-abundant locations.
Using a quasi-exhaustive panel of French manufacturing firms we then show that the predicted
patterns for the micro-economics of offshoring are strongly supported by the data. Finally, we
use a foreign-supply shock based instrument and one based on the reduction in EU external tar-
iffs in the late 90s to identify a causal impact of reduced offshoring costs on the increase in the
skill intensity of French manufacturing firms. We find that the bulk of the observed within-firm
increase in the skill intensity of importers from labor-abundant countries can be explained by
increased imports from these countries.
This work is a first step in an attempt to understand how Heckscher-Ohlin forces operate at
the within-industry and within-firm level. Our empirical analysis has provided some evidence that
Heckscher-Ohlin driven offshoring can be a powerful driver for changes in the relative demand for
skill within firms. An interesting avenue for future research is to develop a more structural version
of our model in order to better understand its quantitative implications in general equilibrium.
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Appendix: For Online Publication
Appendix A: Proofs of the Two-Intermediate Model
A-1.1 Equilibrium Price Level and Mass of Firms
Equations (9) and (10) enable us to express the price level P and the mass of firms Mas functions
of equilibrium outcomes γo and wl:
P =
E
σM (foγ−a + fe)
, (27)
M =
[(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ 2a
a− σ + 1
[
E
σ (foγ−a + fe)
]σ−1 [
w
1−σ
2
l
(
1− γσ−a−1o
)
+ (τ o)
1−σ
2 γσ−a−1o
]] 1σ−2
.(28)
A-1.2 Characterization of FMC
Slope
Solving (12) for γσ−a−1o and differentiating with respect to wl yields
∂γσ−a−1o
∂wl
=
[
1
4 (1− σ)w
1−σ
2
−1
l
(
w−1l H/L− 1
)− 12w 1−σ2 −2l H/L] (τ o) 1−σ2[
1
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1−σ
2
l
(
w−1l H/L− 1
)
+ (τ o)
1−σ
2
]2 < 0, (29)
since w−1l H/L− 1 > 0 for wl ∈ (τ,H/L). Since σ − a− 1 < 0, ∂γo/∂wl > 0.
wl = 1
Evaluating (12) at wl = 1 yields
γσ−a−1o =
1
2 (H/L− 1)
1
2 (H/L− 1) + (τ o)
1−σ
2
∈ (0, 1) . (30)
Since σ − a− 1 < 0, γo > 1.
γo →∞
Solving (12) for γσ−a−1o , we have that when we let γ0 →∞, the LHS of the resulting expression
tends to 0. Thus, for the RHS to match the LHS, wl → H/L.
Shifts of the FMC Schedule
Relative factor endowments Differentiating γσ−a−1o with respect to H/L,
∂γσ−a−1o
∂ (H/L)
=
1
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]2 > 0. (31)
Hence, ∂γo/∂ (H/L) < 0.
1
Variable cost of offshoring Differentiating γσ−a−1o with respect to τ o,
∂γσ−a−1o
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Hence, ∂γo/∂τ
o < 0.
A-1.3 Characterization of OFE
Slope
Differentiating ΦOFE with respect to γo,
∂ΦOFE
∂γo
=
a− σ + 1
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All terms are unambiguosly positive except for[
(σ − 1) γσ−2o
(
γ−ao + f
e/fo
)− aγσ−a−2o ] . (34)
Assuming this term is positive,
[
(σ − 1) γσ−2o
(
γ−ao + f
e/fo
)− aγσ−a−2o ] > 0⇔ γo > [a− σ + 1σ − 1 fofe
]1/a
. (35)
Thus, [(a− σ + 1) fo] / [(σ − 1) fe] < 1 is a sufficient condition for ∂ΦOFE/∂γo > 0.
Differentiating ΦOFE with respect to wl,
∂ΦOFE
∂wl
=
(σ − 1) (a− σ + 1)
a
(
γ−ao + fe/fo
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Thus, under the condition [(a− σ + 1) fo] / [(σ − 1) fe] < 1,
∂γo
∂wl
= −∂ΦOFE/∂wl
∂ΦOFE/∂γo
< 0. (37)
wl → 1
Equation (13) can be written as
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As wl → τ , the LHS tends to zero. For the RHS to match this, we need that γo →∞.
Shifts of the OFE Schedule
Fixed costs Differentiating ΦOFE with respect to f
e/fo,
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Thus, under the condition [(a− σ + 1) fo] / [(σ − 1) fe] < 1,
∂γo
∂ (fe/fo)
= −∂ΦOFE/∂ (f
e/fo)
∂ΦOFE/∂γo
< 0. (40)
Hence, ∂γo/∂f
e < 0 and ∂γo/∂f
o > 0.
Variable cost of offshoring Differentiating ΦOFE with respect to τ
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Thus, under the condition [(a− σ + 1) fo] / [(σ − 1) fe] < 1,
∂γo
∂τ o
= −∂ΦOFE/∂τ
o
∂ΦOFE/∂γo
> 0. (42)
Comparative statics of τ o
Applying the implicit function theorem to the system of equations (12)-(13) yields
∂γo
∂τ o
= −
∂ΦOFE
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It is easy to see that the denominator is positive: ∂ΦFMC/∂τ
o > 0, ∂ΦOFE/∂wl > 0, ∂ΦFMC/∂wl <
0 and ∂ΦOFE/∂γo > 0. As for the numerator,
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Thus, ∂γo/∂τ
o > 0.
Appendix B: A Many-country Model with a Continuum of Intermediate Inputs
A-2.4 Cutoff inputs z12 and z23
The cutoff inputs ilustrated in Figure 7 are defined by
τ owz12h1 w
1−z12
l1 = τ
owz12h2 w
1−z12
l2 , (45)
τ owz23h2 w
1−z23
l2 = w
z23
h3 w
1−z23
l3 . (46)
3
Given factor prices, it is easy to see that ln τ o + z log (wh1) + (1− z) log (wl1) is increasing in z,
ln τ o+z log (wh2)+(1− z) log (wl2) = ln τ o for all z, and z log (wh3)+(1− z) log (wl3) is decreasing
in z.
A-2.5 Marginal costs
A country-3 firm may offshore no inputs (zo3 = 0), offshore from country 1 only (z
o
3 ∈ [0, z12]), or
offshore from country 1 and country 2 (zo3 ∈ [z12, z23]). It is easy to show that a country-3 firm
would not offshore to country 2 only.
For zo3 = 0, the marginal cost of country-3 firm is
MC0 (γ) =
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γ
∫ 1
0
ln
(
wzh3w
1−z
l3
)
dz =
1
γ
w
1/2
h3 w
1/2
l3 . (47)
For zo3 ∈ (0, z12],
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For zo3 ∈ (z12, z23],
MC2 (γ) =
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The following results are easy to show:
1. For zo3 ∈ (0, z12], ∂MC1/∂zo3 = MC1 [ln τ o + (2zo3 − 1) log (wl3/wh3)] = MC1B1. From
Figure 7, B1 < 0.
2. For zo3 ∈ (z12, z23], ∂MC2/∂zo3 = MC2 [ln τ o [[zo3 − 1] logwl3 − zo3 log (wh3)]] = MC2B2.
Again from Figure 7, B2 < 0.
3. The marginal cost function is continuous at z12: evaluating equations (48) and (49) at z12
yields the same value.
4. The marginal cost function is differentiable at z12: evaluating ∂MC1/∂z
o
3 and ∂MC2/∂z
o
3
at z12 yields the same value.
5. For zo3 ∈ (0, z12] and for zo3 ∈ (z12, z23], ∂2MC1/∂ (zo3)2 = MC
(
B2 + ∂B/∂zo3
)
> 0
6. We cannot rule out the possibility of a kink in ∂MC/∂zo3 at z
o
3 = z12. However, the function
MC is still convex in zo3 due to results 1-5.
A-2.6 Variable profits
Conditional upon entry, firms in country 3 maximize
max
p,zo3
Π(z) = max
p,zo3
p(γ)q(γ)−MC(γ)q(γ)− zo3Pfo, (50)
4
The first order condition with respect to p yields
p =
σ
σ − 1MC. (51)
We define variable profits as
pi (γ, zo3) = [p (γ, z
o
3)−MC (γ, zo3)] q (γ, zo3) =
=
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∑
j
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Since variable profits are an inverse function of marginal costs,
∂pi (γ, zo3)
∂zo3
∝MC1−σB > 0, (53)
∂2pi (γ, zo3) /∂ (z
o
3)
2 < 0, and ∂2pi (γ, zo3) /∂z
o
3∂γ > 0. There is the possibility of a kink in ∂pi/∂z
o
3
at zo3 = z12, but pi is still concave in z
o
3. Finally,
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∝ (1− σ)
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]
< 0. (54)
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Appendix C: Additional Figures and Tables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 5th Pct. 95th Pct. Obs.
Skill ratio 1.18 4.50 0.14 3.50 646,920
Employees 53.51 336.58 3.00 174.00 646,920
(log) TFP 33.48 18.07 2.67 63.70 646,920
(log) Capital/labor 40.49 43.14 1.52 125.80 646,920
Imports (in 1000 euros) 1.375 26.606 0 3.030 646,920
Exports (in 1000 euros) 1.908 24.403 0 4.047 646,920
Number of products imported (all sources) 5.365 16.719 0 29,00 64,920
Number of products imported (95% cutoff) 6.080 11.542 1 24,00 96,982
Number of origin countries (all sources) 1.863 3.959 0 10,00 646,920
Number of origin countries (95 % cutoff) 2.729 3.079 1 8,00 96,982
Table A-1: Summary Statistics Summary statistics for the baseline estimating sample. 95% cutoff refers to
the group of countries with a level secondary schooling less than 95% of that of France. See Table A2 for the list
of countries.
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Table A-2: Country List
Secondary schooling relative to France
countries with less than 95 percent
Afghanistan Liberia
Albania Libya
Algeria Macao
Argentina Malawi
Bahrain Malaysia
Bangladesh Maldives
Barbados Mali
Belize Malta
Benin Mauritania
Bolivia Mauritius
Botswana Mexico
Brazil Morocco
Bulgaria Mozambique
Burundi Namibia
Cambodia Nepal
Cameroon New Zealand
Central African R. Nicaragua
Chile Niger
China Pakistan
Colombia Panama
Congo, Republic of Papua New Guinea
Costa Rica Paraguay
Cote d‘Ivoire Peru
Croatia Philippines
Cuba Poland
Cyprus Qatar
Czech Republic Romania
Dominican Republic Rwanda
Ecuador Saudi Arabia
Egypt Senegal
El Salvador Sierra Leone
Fiji Singapore
Gabon Slovak Republic
Gambia Slovenia
Ghana South Africa
Greece Sri Lanka
Guatemala Sudan
Guyana Swaziland
Haiti Syria
Honduras Taiwan
Hong Kong Tanzania
Hungary Thailand
India Togo
Indonesia Tonga
Iran Trinidad
Iraq Tunisia
Jamaica Turkey
Japan Uganda
Jordan United Arab Emirates
Kenya Uruguay
Kuwait Venezuela
Laos Vietnam
Latvia Yemen
Lesotho Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Dependent variable is skill intensity of importsft
from countries ≤ 80 percent of French sec. schooling
(1) (3) (2) (4)
log(TFP)f,t−1 0.0058*** 0.0029* 0.0039** 0.0031*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(employees)f,t -0.0028*** 0.0012
(0.001) (0.002)
log(capital/labor)f,t 0.0023***
(0.001) (0.002)
log(exports)f,t -0.0003 0.0007
(0.000) (0.001)
log(imports)f,t 0.0035*** 0.0019**
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 48,340 48,340 48,340 48,340
Firms 12,047 12,047 12,047 12,047
Firm FE NO NO YES YES
4-digit Sector FE YES YES NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm
R-squared 0.3258 0.3279 0.0057 0.0061
Table A-3: Skill-intensity of imports from labor-abundant countries and productivity
The dependent variable is the average skill intensity of imports from labor-abundant countries at the firm level (see
the data section for an explanation of the construction of this variable). We consider imports from countries with
less than 80 percent of the French level of secondary schooling. The main explanatory variable of interest is the
one-year lag of firm-level productivity computed with the Levinsohn-Petrin method, log(TFP )f,t. Other controls
are (all at the firm level and in logs): the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the value of exports
and imports.
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dependent variable is log(skill ratio)ft; countries ≤ 95 percent of French sec. schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
import status 0.1980*** 0.2517*** 0.0429*** 0.0474***
below thresholdf,t (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
imports/sales 0.2659** 0.2487** 0.2325** 0.1853*
below thresholdf,t (0.109) (0.102) (0.113) (0.095)
import status -0.0260*** 0.0032 -0.0121*** 0.0029
above thresholdf,t (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
imports/sales -0.0086 -0.0082 -0.0245 -0.0368**
above thresholdf,t (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
log(TFP)f,t 0.3925*** -0.0112*** -0.0124*** -0.0011
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012)
log(employees)f,t -0.1801*** -0.1708*** -0.1721*** -0.2407***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.026)
log(capital/labor)f,t 0.0237*** -0.0183*** -0.0186*** -0.0463***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017)
export statusf,t 0.1410*** 0.0156***
(0.006) (0.003)
log(exports)f,t 0.0077*** 0.0106***
(0.001) (0.004)
Observations 646,920 646,920 646,920 646,920 646,920 646,920 49,613 49,613
Firms 104,036 104,037 104,038 104,039 104,036 104,036 11,763 11,763
Sample all all all all all all importers importers
Firm FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
4-digit sector FE YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
R-squared 0.2037 0.2508 0.0040 0.0112 0.0042 0.0114 0.0509 0.0660
Table A-4: Skill ratio of production and importing from labor-abundant countries (extensive and intensive margin).
The dependent variable is the firm-level (log) skill ratio of production, defined as the ratio of non-production workers to production workers. We consider imports
from countries with less than 80 percent of the French level of secondary schooling. In columns (1)-(4), the main explanatory variable of interest is a dummy for
importing from the set of labor-abundant countries (import status below threshold). The specifications also include a dummy for importing from the set of skill-
abundant countries (import status above threshold). In columns (5)-(8), the main explanatory variable of interest is the ratio of imports from set of labor-abundant
countries relative to sales (import/sales below threshold). The specifications also include the ratio of imports from the set of skill-abundant countries relative to
sales (imports/sales above threshold). Other controls are (all at the firm level and in logs): TFP (constructed with the Levinsohn-Petrin method), the number of
employees, the capital-labor ratio and the value of exports.
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First Stage Dep. var.: imports/sales Dep. var.: imports/sales Second Stage Dep. var.: log(skill ratio)f,t
below thresholdf,t above thresholdf,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Supply Shock (below) 0.0023*** 0.0021*** 0.0022* 0.0021 imports/sales (below) 4.7407** 4.4903**
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0013) (2.282) (2.220)
IV Supply Shock (above) -0.0070** -0.0066* 0.0090*** 0.0091** imports/sales (above) -3.5204* -2.8695
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0031) (1.987) (1.914)
log(TFP)f,t -0.0046** -0.0155*** log(TFP)f,t -0.0238
(0.0020) (0.0033) (0.035)
log(employees)f,t -0.0287*** -0.0200*** log(employees)f,t -0.1710**
(0.0034) (0.0067) (0.081)
log(capital/labor)f,t -0.0028 -0.0007 log(capital/labor)f,t -0.0350
(0.0024) (0.0033) (0.022)
log(exports)f,t 0.0087*** 0.0107*** log(exports)f,t 0.0037
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.031)
F-statistic (Angrist-Pischke) 17,01 12,47 15,81 11,51
Observations 46,780 46,780 46,780 46,780 46,780 46,780
Firms 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930
Sample importers importers importers importers importers importers
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table A-5: Skill ratio of production and importing from labor-abundant countries (IV estimates).
The dependent variable in the second-stage regression (columns (5)-(6)) is the firm-level (log) skill ratio of production, defined as the ratio of non-production workers
to production workers. The main explanatory variable of interest is the ratio of imports from set of labor-abundant countries relative to sales (import/sales below
threshold). The specifications also include the ratio of imports from the set of skill-abundant countries relative to sales (imports/sales above threshold). We consider
imports from countries with less than 80 percent of the French level of secondary schooling. Other controls are (all at the firm level and in logs): TFP (constructed
with the Levinsohn-Petrin method), the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the value of exports. Both imports/sales below and above threshold are
considered endogenous. Instruments are constructed from foreign supply-shocks (see data section for an explanation). First-stage regressions are reported in columns
(1)-(4). We present Angrist-Pischke F-statistics for the joint significance of instruments with multiple endogenous variables.
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First Stage Dep. var.: imports/sales Dep. var.: imports/sales Second Stage Dep. var.: log(skill ratio)f,t
below thresholdf,t above thresholdf,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Supply Shock (below) 0.0023*** 0.0021*** 0.0022* 0.0021 imports/sales (below) 4.7407** 4.4903**
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0013) (2.282) (2.220)
IV Supply Shock (above) -0.0070** -0.0066* 0.0090*** 0.0091** imports/sales (above) -3.5204* -2.8695
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0031) (1.987) (1.914)
log(TFP)f,t -0.0046** -0.0155*** log(TFP)f,t -0.0238
(0.0020) (0.0033) (0.035)
log(employees)f,t -0.0287*** -0.0200*** log(employees)f,t -0.1710**
(0.0034) (0.0067) (0.081)
log(capital/labor)f,t -0.0028 -0.0007 log(capital/labor)f,t -0.0350
(0.0024) (0.0033) (0.022)
log(exports)f,t 0.0087*** 0.0107*** log(exports)f,t 0.0037
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.031)
F-statistic (Angrist-Pischke) 17,01 12,47 15,81 11,51
Observations 46,780 46,780 46,780 46,780 46,780 46,780
Firms 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930 8,930
Sample importers importers importers importers importers importers
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Table A-6: Skill ratio of production and importing from labor-abundant countries (IV estimates).
The dependent variable in the second-stage regression (columns (5)-(6)) is the firm-level (log) skill ratio of production, defined as the ratio of non-production workers
to production workers. The main explanatory variable of interest is the ratio of imports from set of labor-abundant countries relative to sales (import/sales below
threshold). The specifications also include the ratio of imports from the set of skill-abundant countries relative to sales (imports/sales above threshold). We consider
imports from countries with less than 80 percent of the French level of secondary schooling. Other controls are (all at the firm level and in logs): TFP (constructed
with the Levinsohn-Petrin method), the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the value of exports. Both imports/sales below and above threshold are
considered endogenous. Instruments are constructed from foreign supply-shocks (see data section for an explanation). First-stage regressions are reported in columns
(1)-(4). We present Angrist-Pischke F-statistics for the joint significance of instruments with multiple endogenous variables.
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dependent variable is log(skill ratio)f,t
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
skill intensity 0.2716*** 0.1827*** 0.0614** 0.0642** 0.3469* 0.3564* 0.3416* 0.3501*
importsf,t (0.074) (0.069) (0.030) (0.030) (0.192) (0.190) (0.194) (0.191)
log(TFP)f,t 0.5379*** -0.0091 -0.0101 -0.0098
(0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
log(employees)f,t -0.1879*** -0.2665*** -0.2794*** -0.2784***
(0.010) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
log(capital/labor)f,t -0.0557*** -0.0612*** -0.0626*** -0.0616***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
log(imports)f,t 0.0640*** 0.0226*** 0.0298*** 0.0300***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log(exports)f,t 0.0347*** 0.0060 0.0061 0.0062
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 48,504 48,504 48,504 48,504 39,527 39,527 39,527 39,527
Firms 12,086 12,086 12,086 12,086 7,833 7,833 7,858 7,858
Firm FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
4-digit sector FE YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
R-squared 0.2636 0.3395 0.0455 0.0620 0.0457 0.0634 0.0457 0.0634
First-stage regression: dependent variable is skill intensity of importsf,t
tariff-predicted skill intensityf,t 0.4153*** 0.4147*** 0.4164*** 0.4158***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
supply-shock-predicted skill intensityf,t -0,0022 -0,0023
(0.0022) (0.0024)
F-statistic 359.69 375.75 184.64 183.87
Hansen J statistic (p-value) n.a. n.a. 0.83 0.46
Table A-7: Skill ratio of production and the skill intensity of imports from labor-abundant countries: OLS and IV estimates.
Columns (1)-(4) present OLS estimates and columns (5)-(6) present IV estimates. The main explanatory variable of interest is the average skill intensit of imports
from labor-abundant countries. For an explanation of the construction of this variable see the data description. We consider imports from countries with less than
80 percent of the French level of secondary schooling (see the main text for the results obtained using a 95 percent cutoff). Other controls are (all at the firm level
and in logs): TFP (constructed with the Levinsohn-Petrin method), the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio, the value of imports and the value of exports.
The skill intensity of imports is considered endogenous. The instruments are the tariff-predicted skill intensity of imports (columns 5 and 6) and the supply-shock
predicted skill intensity of imports (columns (7) and (8)). See the data section for a discussion of the IV strategy. We report F-statistics for the joint significance of
the instruments and the P-value for the Hansen over-identification test in (H0: instruments uncorrelated with the residuals)
.
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